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Abstract
This thesis contributes to two traditional debates in quantitative macroeconomics: (i) the wel-
fare costs of aggregate shocks and (ii) the role of financial integration for international business
cycle co-movement and risk-sharing. In recent years both debates regained attention, in par-
ticular after the experience of the recent U.S. financial crisis and the subsequent international
recession.
The first chapter of this thesis, joint work with Tommaso Oliviero, investigates the welfare
effects of the U.S. Great Recession. Motivated by evidence that more leveraged households lost
more in terms of housing wealth during the recent recession, we quantify the welfare effects of
the Great Recession for two types of households, namely borrowers and savers. We simulate the
Great Recession as a contemporaneous negative shock to aggregate income and the efficiency of
the financial intermediation sector. The latter moves the interest rates for debt and is therefore
the main driver behind households’ leverage. We find that in the Great recession borrowers lose
significantly more in terms of welfare than savers. In counter-factual experiments we find this
loss to be larger the higher the households’ leverage. This last effect comes from non-linearity
that is absent in a model with an always binding collateral constraint (i.e. constant leverage).
The second chapter contributes to the debate on the role of financial integration for international
business cycles. For the G7 countries, I document that country pairs with more bilateral FDI
linkages have more synchronized investment cycles. I also find that the relation between FDI
integration and synchronization of gross domestic product (GDP) is - yet positive - statistically
insignificant after controlling for time fixed effects. I then study a model of international busi-
ness cycles with an essential role for FDI and shocks to multinational activity. In the model,
more FDI openness unambiguously increases investment synchronization while the effect on
GDP synchronization is ambivalent. Due to mismeasurement of intangible capital in national
accounts, the actual elasticity of output synchronization with respect to FDI integration is un-
derestimated. The effects measured in the data are quantitatively consistent with the model
predictions. The model also has important implications for consumption risk sharing. Finally,
shocks to multinational activity have the potential to resolve the so called ‘quantity puzzle’ in
international macroeconomics.
iii
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Overview of the thesis chapters
This thesis contributes to the literature by investigating the welfare consequences of ag-
gregate shocks and the role of financial integration for international business cycles. Both
topics have a long tradition in macroeconomic research and have regained interest with
the events starting in 2007 that led to the U.S. Great Recession and eventually turned
into an international recession.
The first chapter of this thesis, joint work with Tommaso Oliviero, investigates the welfare
consequences of the U.S. Great Recession. Using Panel data evidence from the Survey of
Consumer Finances 2007/09, we document that households that were more leveraged in
2007 experienced a bigger loss in housing wealth during the recession. We then quantify
the welfare effects of the observed drop in house prices during the Great Recession for
leveraged and un-leveraged households. For this purpose, calibrate a dynamic general
equilibrium model with heterogeneous households to the U.S. economy and simulate the
Great Recession as a contemporaneous negative shock to aggregate income and a negative
shock to the financial intermediation sector. Intermediation shocks affect the ability of
the banking sector to transform deposits into credit and therefore drive households’ lever-
age. Aggregate income shocks account, instead, for the observed drop in house prices.
There are three main lessons from the theory. First, in the Great recession leveraged
households (borrowers) experience significantly bigger welfare losses than un-leveraged
agents (savers). Second, intermediation shocks have, by their nature, re-distributive ef-
fects by transferring wealth from borrowers to savers. Third, leverage plays an important
role for welfare: we estimate that a significant part of borrowers’ welfare loss comes from
the fact the leverage was high when the recession hit the economy. This last effect is
absent in a model with an always binding collateral constraint (as often assumed in the
literature).
The second chapter studies the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) through multi-
nationals on the international transmission of shocks. For the G7 country pairs, I find
vi
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that increases in bilateral FDI linkages are associated with more synchronized investment
cycles. This is an important finding because one of the most robust predictions of the
standard international business cycle model is the strong negative correlation of invest-
ment when financial markets integrate. With respect to aggregate activity, I find that the
relation between FDI integration and synchronization of gross domestic product (GDP)
is - yet positive - statistically insignificant, confirming the literature that is inconclusive
on this issue. I then study a model of international business cycles with an essential
role for FDI and shocks to multinational activity. Multinationals accumulate technol-
ogy capital that can be contemporaneously used in all plants the multinational operates,
independent whether located in the home country or abroad. In addition, the produc-
tivity of multinationals is stochastic and gets transferred to all plants the multinational
operates. Therefore, multinationals itself act as a source of business cycles volatility -
on top of affecting the propagation mechanism of country-specific shocks that originate
in other sectors of the economy. The model predicts that more FDI openness unam-
biguously increases investment synchronization. It also offers a rationale for the weak
link between FDI integration and GDP synchronization: In national accounts, GDP is
mismeasured because intangible capital is expensed. Due to this mismeasurement, the
actual elasticity of output synchronization with respect to FDI integration is underesti-
mated. Finally, I use the model to assess the risk sharing implications when countries
open up for FDI. I show that even when financial markets are complete, FDI integration
reduces the consumption risk to which households are exposed by mitigating the impact
of country-specific shocks on production. This reduction in aggregate risk is strongest
in the model with country-specific shocks only. Shocks to multinational activity, on the
other side, counter-act the risk-reducing effect of more FDI linkages because production
in both countries is increasingly determined by shocks to multinationals. To the best of
my knowledge, I am the first one to make this point in a fully dynamic business cycle
framework. This last point is also related to the so called ‘quantity puzzle’ in international
macroeconomics that refers to the counter-factual ranking of cross-country correlations
of GDP and consumption in standard business cycle models. When households cannot
trade any financial assets, the model with shocks to multinational activity generates the
observed ranking in the data because households are left with a large part of risk that is
uninsured.
vii
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Chapter 1
Financial Intermediation, House
Prices, and the Welfare Effects of
the U.S. Great Recession
With Tommaso Oliviero
1.1 Introduction
The U.S. Great Recession was characterized by a large fall in GDP coupled with an
unprecedented collapse in the housing market. This drop in aggregate house price between
2007:IV and 2009:II deeply affected a great number of U.S. households. 1 Figure 1.1 shows
the de-trended quarterly series of US GDP and aggregate house prices. We observe a
large drop of around 5.4% between the NBER recession dates, and a collapse in aggregate
house prices of about 11%.
The recession has also been linked turbulence in the financial markets and, in particular,
the banking system. This fact has triggered a debate among economists and policy-
makers about the welfare consequences of the financial innovation process that preceded
the crisis and that possibly exacerbated the effects of the economic collapse. In fact, the
last decade witnessed an increase in household indebtedness that coincided with a period
of relaxing credit conditions. Both microeconomic and macroecronomic evidence show an
increase in household leverage in the years preceding the recession. On the micro side, an
analysis of Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) data reveals that aggregate mortgage debt
1(Iacoviello, 2011b) shows that housing wealth represents about half of total household net worth in
2008 and almost two third of median household total wealth
1
Menno, Dominik (2014), Topics in quantitative macroeconomics 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12157
Figure 1.1: GDP growth vs. house price growth
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Notes: Shaded areas are NBER recession dates. The grey dotted-line is the Y2Y-growth rate of All-Transactions House
Price Index for the United States deflated by CPI (less shelter); the black line is Y2Y growth of U.S. real GDP. For a
detailed data description see appendix A.1.
expanded by 59% between 2001 and 2007, despite a 19% increase in housing wealth. On
the macro side, we observe around ten quarters of growth in leverage followed by sharp
fall during the NBER recession dates, as seen in the mortgage to real estate ratio. Figure
1.2 plots the year-to-year growth rate of leverage and the spread between the mortgage
interest rate and the federal funds rate. These two series show a negative correlation at
the onset, and in the last quarters of the Great Recession. During the quarters preceding
the crisis, spreads were particularly low and leverage was rising at an unprecedented
rate. In mid-2008 however, interest rate spreads jumped to a level of about 4.5% while
household leverage started to decline. Our interpretation is that, in the period of credit
expansion (low spreads), the mortgage growth rate was faster than real estate inflation
and leverage was increasing; the opposite happened in a period of credit contraction (high
spreads).
In the current paper we examine the effects of exogenous changes in interest rate spreads
on endogenous aggregate house prices and, ultimately, on households’ welfare. In this
respect, we share the view that fluctuations in spreads largely reflect disturbances in
the financial markets’ assessments of credit risk (Bordo, 2008). Furthermore, we share
the view of Adrian and Shin (2010) that variations in the price of default risk reflected
2
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Figure 1.2: Mortgage spread vs. Leverage
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adjustable mortgage rate (ARM) and the federal funds rate from 2002:I to 2010:II. Spreads of ARM over Fed Funds rate
are shown in levels (percent p.a.). The black line is Y2Y growth of U.S. leverage defined as the ratio between mortgage
and real estate series (taken from the balance sheet of U.S. households and nonprofit organizations). For a detailed data
description see appendix A.1.
variations in the effective risk-bearing capacity of the financial sector, which has been
ultimately affected by aggregate portfolio losses.
The stylized facts highlighted in figures 1.1 and 1.2 motivate our interest in quantify-
ing and isolating the impacts of financial and income shocks on aggregate house prices
and, consequently, on households’ welfare. In particular we address this question within
a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous households and en-
dogenous collateral constraints. In our model, households differ in their level of patience.
This heterogeneity results into two types of agents: borrowers, who are potentially fi-
nancial constrained; and savers, who are unconstrained.2 Within this framework, we
study the welfare effects of an endogenous drop in housing wealth for these two groups of
households. The data in table 1.1 motivate the choice of this cross-sectional heterogeneity
across households. Using panel data from the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) for the
period from 2007 to 2009, the table shows that households with a positive net savings
position (savers) show an average drop in housing wealth of 9.2% between 2007 and 2009.
2The structure of the economy is similar to Iacoviello (2011a) and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tam-
balotti (2013) who present a quantitative analysis of the US Great Recession
3
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This is significantly lower than the equivalent number for households with a negative net
savings position (borrowers, -16.6%).3 Moreover we show that the drop in housing wealth
for borrowers is increasing in the level of leverage in 2007:4 while borrowers with initial
levels of leverage greater than or equal to 67% show a drop of 23.5% in housing wealth,
households that entered the recession with a lower level of leverage (less than 43%) show
a much smaller drop in housing wealth.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics from SCF panel 2007-2009
Household type2007 Savers Borrowers All households
∆07,09housing wealth -9.2% -16.6% -12.9%
Leverage2007 < 43% 43 - 67% >67%
∆07,09housing wealth -12.9% -16.5% -23.5 %
In the model economy, agents are fully rational and derive utility from both the consump-
tion of perishable goods and of housing services coming from housing stock. Housing is
the only physical asset in the economy and it is fixed in supply. This is motivated by
the fact that previous and during the Great Recession, house prices were most volatile in
geographical areas where the supply of houses was relatively fixed.5 The financial friction
arises because agents have to collateralize short positions of one-period financial asset by
a fraction of the expected value of their available housing stock.
In this otherwise standard model, we introduce a competitive financial intermediation
sector. All saving and borrowing is conducted though this sector, which faces exogenous
shocks to its technology.6 These shocks give rise to a spread between borrowing and
3In table 1.1, saver and borrower status refers to households in 2007. Savers and borrowers are defined
here - and throughout the paper- as households that show respectively a positive or a negative net asset
position. A net asset position is defined as the sum of savings bonds, directly held bonds, the cash
value of life insurances, certificates of deposits, quasi-liquid retirement accounts and all other types of
transaction accounts minus the debt secured by primary residence, the debt secured by other residential
property, credit card debt and other forms of debt. For a detailed description of data please refer to
Appendix A.1
4Leverage is defined here - and thorough the remaining sections- as the ratio between net asset position
and total housing wealth.
5See figure IV in Mian and Sufi (2009).
6We consider a simple model for the financial intermediation in the spirit of Cooper and Ejarque
(2000) and Cúrdia and Woodford (2010). Otherwise, the link to these studies is limited as the former
looks at the business cycle properties of financial shocks within a representative agent framework, while
the latter studies the implications of spread shocks for the optimal conduct of monetary policy.
4
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lending such that the collateral constraint does not necessarily bind. In other words, it
generates endogenous changes in the households’ leverage. The second source of aggre-
gate disturbance comes from standard aggregate income shocks that directly affect the
households’ endowment of the perishable good. This may be interpreted as a reduced
form way to capture the cyclical behavior of productivity shocks.
We calibrate the model to the US economy and simulate the Great Recession as a con-
temporaneous negative income and financial shock that follows a period of moderate
economic, credit expansion and increasing leverage. This characterization is due to the
empirical observation that both income and financial intermediation were above (below)
the long run trend before (after) the recession. To calibrate our key parameters we con-
sider moments from both micro and macro data. In particular, we were able to match
the leverage and the wealth share of borrowers relative to savers using from the Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF, waves 1998 - 2007). This calibration strategy, although
different from the approach of most papers in the existing literature which target macro
moments only, results in calibrated parameters that are compatible with recent contri-
butions (Iacoviello and Guerrieri (2012)).
A very delicate issue for the calibration exercise is what time frame to use, and in par-
ticular, whether to incorporate a recession or not. We take the following stance. Our
main goal is to maintain a close link between the model and the research question. We
study the Great Recession as a state-contingent exogenous event that hit the US econ-
omy in late 2007, following a period characterized by banking innovation and increasing
household leverage. Therefore, we consider the Great Recession as a low probabilistic
event embedded in a business cycle framework. For this reason, we calibrate the model
to data including the quarters of the recession until 2009:II.7 The structural nature of
our exercise allows us to conduct counter-factual experiments in order to disentangle the
quantitative effects of income and intermediation shocks on aggregate house prices and
agents’ welfare.
We have three major findings. First, we find that our benchmark model quantitatively
explains the observed drop in house prices during the Great Recession. The majority of
the effect is attributed to real income shocks. Financial intermediation shocks explain
only a small percentage of the observed drop. This finding confirms that the observed
behavior of aggregate house prices, before and after the Recession, could be partially
related to changes in fully expected shocks. More importantly, we find that, in contrast
7For the micro data, SCF is run every three years. We decided to include the 2009 wave and not to
include the 2010 wave of the survey in the analysis in order to be consistent with the other calibrated
parameters in the model. However, even when including the 2010 wave, the targeted values are very
similar.
5
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to the widespread view, shocks in the financial sector have very limited quantitative
effects on aggregate house prices.
Second, we find that borrowers significantly lost more than savers in the Great Recession.
In particular we highlight a significant difference in the welfare effects of income and
financial intermediation shocks. In the Great Recession, the negative income shock was
the main driver behind the absolute drop in house prices and the absolute level of agents’
welfare losses. The financial intermediation shock is instead the main determinant of
changes in households’ leverage before and after the house price drop.8. We show that
increasing interest spreads had distributive effects, with savers gaining at the expense of
borrowers. Accordingly we show that an increase in interest rate spreads forced borrowers
to de-leverage and amplified their welfare losses of house price drop by 37.5% while causing
a 66.7% welfare gain for savers. Moreover, counterfactual experiments show that the high
leverage previous to the crisis made borrowers’ welfare losses 25% bigger than if it would
have occurred in a state of low leverage.
Third, we find that if we restrict the collateral constraint so that it always binds, the
amplification effects given by leverage and de-leverage would have been underestimated;
a model with always binding collateral constraint which reduces in fact the volatility of
the aggregate leverage to zero. This is an important finding as previous studies (notably,
Iacoviello (2005)) usually assume that the constraints are always binding. The intuition
for this result is that when the growth rate of the borrowers’ debt is forced to be pro-
portional to changes in expected housing wealth, borrowers leverage up more slowly in
expansions and de-leverage more slowly in contractions when compared to our bench-
mark model. This implies that when the crisis hits, borrowers have more outstanding
debt in the benchmark model that they need to roll-over. In a recent paper, Iacoviello
and Guerrieri (2012) explore the quantitative properties of occasionally binding collat-
eral constraints and the relative non-linear effects coming from changes in the demand
for housing.
The mechanism behind the three findings is the following. First, a negative realization of
one or both of the exogenous shocks leads to credit contractions. In a credit contraction
- given that it is more costly to roll over existing debt - borrowers choose optimally to
reduce their indebtedness. If the reduction in debt is sufficiently large, borrowers need
to reduce their housing stock. For a given supply of housing, house prices must therefore
decrease. This causes borrowers to suffer in terms of both wealth and expected lifetime
utility. On the other hand - because of the lower demand for debt - savers potentially
8This mechanism is in line with the microeconomic evidence of Mian and Sufi (2010), who found that
an increase in credit supply, coupled with the effect of collateralized debt on increasing house prices,
created an unprecedented increase in household leverage in the quarters preceding the crisis
6
Menno, Dominik (2014), Topics in quantitative macroeconomics 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12157
face a lower interest rate on savings. This potentially hurts them by raising the price
of future consumption. However, savers expecting house prices to rise again in the next
period - can smooth their consumption by buying houses when their prices are depressed.
Finally, savers gain in terms of wealth and do not suffer much in terms of expected lifetime
utility. The size of this distributive effect depends crucially on how interest rates move.
In this paper we quantitatively show what exactly distinguishes financial shocks from
income shocks. Another important remark concerns the non-linearity generated by the
collateral constraint. In states of the world where borrowers choose optimally to move
away from the constraint, it becomes slack. That is, borrowers can choose the pace at
which to reduce their debt, unlike the case in models with an always-binding constraint.
This implies a change in the elasticity of the demand for debt and housing with respect
to changes in house prices that could have non-negligible quantitative effects.
The present study is related to two important strands of literature. First, we relate
to the recent literature that studies the financial sector as an autonomous source of
macroeconomic fluctuations (Quadrini and Jermann, 2012) and the literature that claims
that financial frictions played a pre-eminent role in explaining the observed drop in US
aggregate economic activity (Hall, 2011). Recently, Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) find
that a shock to the spread between the interest rate on borrowings and the interest rate on
savings - in the presence of a collateral constraint that links debt to the level of durables -
generates a decrease in the borrowers’ demand for durables that grows stronger as agents
get closer to the credit constraint. While their analysis abstracts from aggregate house
prices and endogenous changes in wealth, we explicitly emphasize the channel that goes
through the endogenous change in house prices.
Second, our analysis relates to recent studies on the distributive effects of the Great
Recession. Compared to Glover, Heathcote, Krueger, and Ríos-Rull (2011) - a study
on intergenerational redistribution during the Great Recession - we focus on a different
dimension of agent heterogeneity and welfare, namely, redistribution between constrained
agents (borrowers) and unconstrained agents (savers). Similar to Hur (2012), we find
that the constrained agents always lose more than unconstrained agents.9 Both of the
aforementioned studies are silent about the inherent redistributive nature of financial
shocks, the focus of this paper.10
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the following section we present the
9Hur (2012) considers an overlapping generations model with collateral constraints; he finds that the
constrained agents are mostly from the young cohort, and that those agents suffer the most during a
recession.
10Another distinguishing element of our analysis to Hur (2012) and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011),
is that they consider the recession as an unanticipated event while, in our economy, agents take into
account the probability of negative aggregate shocks when making decisions about the future.
7
Menno, Dominik (2014), Topics in quantitative macroeconomics 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12157
model. Section 1.3 presents the quantitative analysis. In section 1.4 we compare the
predictions of the benchmark model to alternative specifications, including the case of an
always binding constraint. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 The physical economy
Uncertainty. Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0, 1, . . .. In each period t, the world
experiences one of Z possible exogenous events z ∈ Z = {1, . . . , Z}. The resolution of
uncertainty is represented by an event tree Σ with root σ0, which is given by a fixed
event z0 in which the economy starts at time 0. Each node is characterized by a history
of events, denoted by σt = (σ0, . . . , σt) ∈ Σt = ×tk=0Σk. Each node has Z immediate
successors (σtz+) and a unique predecessor (σ−t ). The exogenous events follow a Markov
process with transition matrix Π.
Agents and Endowments At each node σt there are two types of agents, borrowers
(denoted by a subscript b) and savers (denoted by a subscript s). Borrowers and savers
differ in their rates of time preference, in the sense that borrowers discount the future
more than savers. Formally, we have βs > βb, where βi ∈ (0, 1) for i = s, b. Each group
consists of infinitely many agents but the group size differs: denote by nb and ns the
relative size of the borrower and saver groups. Note that we choose the normalization
nb + ns = 1.
At each node σt, there is a perishable consumption good (non-durable consumption good).
The total endowment of the perishable good is stochastic and depends on the realization
of the shock alone, that is, y(σ−t ) = y(z), where y : Z → R++ is a time-invariant function.
Note that there is no idiosyncratic uncertainty, the endowment of the perishable good
is the same for both types of households. In addition to the non-durable consumption
good, agents trade houses. Houses are the only physical asset in the economy and are
in fixed net supply. This is motivated by the fact that house prices were most volatile
in counties where the supply of houses remained relatively fixed as shown by Mian and
Sufi (2010). At period 0, agent i = b, s owns a stock hi(σ−0 ) ≥ 0 of houses. We normalize∑
i=b,s hi(σ−0 ) = 1.
At node σt let hi(σt) denote agent i′s end-of-period stock of houses. We assume that
houses are traded cum services. That is, buying a house allows the agent to enjoy the
housing services in the same period: if agent i owns hi(σt) houses then he receives a
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service stream of 1 · hi(σt). Other than the service stream, houses do not yield any
dividend payments.11
Markets. At each node, spot markets open and agents trade the perishable consump-
tion good. We choose the perishable good as the numeraire and - without loss of generality
- normalize its price to be equal to 1. Agents can trade housing in every period; that is,
agents i = s, b can buy a unit of housing at node σt at price q(σt). As long as hi ≥ 0,
there is no possibility of default since no promises are made when agents hold a positive
amount of the physical asset. In addition to houses, there are two financial assets, debt
and savings, both one-period securities. We denote agent i’s end-of-period debt holdings
by di(σt) and end-of-period savings by si(σt), respectively. Denote the prices of the re-
spective securities by pj(σt) for j = d, s. We distinguish these two assets because their
effective returns differ. Debt is assumed to be a security for which only negative (short)
positions are allowed, that is, di(σt) ≤ 0. For savings, agents can only take positive (long)
positions, such that si(σt) ≥ 0, for i = b, s and all σt. Asset j = d, s traded at σt promises
a nominal pay-off bj(σtz) at any successor node σtz. We normalize bj(σtz) = 1 for all
σt, σtz. For the remainder of the paper, we will discuss pay offs in in terms of real interest
rates: denote by RD(σt) = 1pd(σt) the real interest rate on debt and R(σt) =
1
ps(σt) the real
interest rate on savings. We also restrict borrowers to hold zero savings and savers to
hold zero debt. Formally, for all nodes σt, we have db(σt) ≤ 0, sb(σt) = 0, ds(σt) = 0, and
ss(σt) ≥ 0.12
Collateral Requirements and Default. Similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) we
assume limits on debt obligations. Houses are distinguished from other assets by the fact
that they are widely used as collateral for debt obligations (mortgages). As in Iacoviello
and Neri (2010), the theoretical justification for collateral constraints is the ability of
borrowers to default on their debt promises. If the borrowers default in some successor
node σtz+, lenders can seize the borrowers’ assets, q(σtz+)hb(σt) by paying a proportional
transaction cost of (1−m)E[q(σtz+)|σt]hb(σt) that is not redistributed. This transaction
cost can be thought of as a loss associated with bankruptcy. Lenders will therefore never
accept a debt contract where the borrowers’ promises exceed the expected collateral value
11These assumptions are for simplicity. We could allow the service stream of houses to depend on the
realization of the shock z or on the identity of the agent.
12This is only for the ease of exposition. When computing the equilibrium policy functions, we allow
borrowers and savers to trade both assets, debt and savings. Borrowers will only want to take long
positions in savings for high relative wealth shares. In the calibrated economy, this never occurs along
the equilibrium path unless the initial wealth share of the borrowers is very high.
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of housing. Formally, in each node σt, promises made by the borrower have to satisfy
RD(σt)d(σt) +mE[q(σtz+)|σt]hb(σt) ≥ 0. (1.1)
Note that in some successor node z˜ ∈ σtz+ it might still be optimal for the borrowers to
default ex-post. We assume throughout the analysis, however, that m is small enough
that borrowers will never default in equilibrium:
Assumption 1
m ≤ min (q(σtz
+))
E[q(σtz+)|σt] for all σt.
There is no default in equilibrium if and only if this condition is satisfied.13 When solving
the model equilibrium numerically, we assume that this condition holds and verify ex post
that it is indeed satisfied for all prices along the equilibrium path. This allows us to treat
debt as risk free.14
Utilities and budget constraints Agents i = s, b maximize a time-separable utility
function
Ui(ci, hi) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βti u(cs,t, hs,t) (1.2)
where E0 is the expectation operator at the the starting date t = 0. We consider period-
by-period utility functions u(c, h) : R++ × [0, 1]→ R characterized by constant elasticity
of substitution.
u(c, h) = Ψ(c, h)
(1−γ)
1− γ , and Ψ(c, h) = [φc
ρ + (1− φ)hρ] 1ρ
13Assuming default costs equal to zero, borrowers default in some successor node z˜ ∈ σtz+ iff
−mE[q(σtz+)|σt]hb(σt) + q(z˜)hb(σt) < 0,
That is, whenever the realized value of housing is smaller than the maximum amount promised. Since
in any financial market equilibrium, house prices and - by the Inada conditions - hb are strictly positive
for a small enough m, this condition does not hold. As an alternative to a condition on m, we could just
assume default costs are sufficiently high that it is never optimal for the borrowers to default.
14We evaluated the robustness of our results by replacing equation (1.1) by the following collateral
requirement:
RD(σt)d(σt) +m ·min
(
q(σtz+)
)
hb(σt) ≥ 0.
This is a tighter constraint and ensures that there is no default in equilibrium, independent of the value
of m. While the qualitative implications remain unaffected, this specification implied slightly smaller
quantitative effects on house prices and welfare. The intuition for the smaller quantitative effects is that
leverage in states of high intermediation is lower compared to the benchmark model and the wealth
distribution is therefore less sensitive to price changes. We stick to the collateral constraint as outlined
in the main text because it has became standard in macroeconomic models with mortgage debt and thus
increases the comparability of our results.
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Note that this class of preferences is strictly monotone, continuously differentiable, strictly
concave, and satisfies the Inada conditions for both ci and hi.
At each node, the savers’ budget constraint is given by
cs(σt) + q(σt)hs(σt) + ss(σt) ≤ y(σt) + ss(σ−t )R(σ−t ) + q(σt)hs(σ−t ) + Υ(st). (1.3)
The right hand-side is the savers’ available income. It consists of the endowment of the
perishable good y(σt), the gross return on savings, and the housing stock carried over
from the previous period. Finally, Υ(st) are resources that are redistributed in a lump-
sum fashion from the financial sector to the households, of which savers receive a share ns,
representing their share in the population. The reason why we need this re-distribution
will be explained in detail below.
Analogously, the borrowers’ budget constraint reads as
cb(σt) + q(σt)hb(σt) + db(σt) ≤ y(σt) + d(σ−t )RD(σ−t ) + q(σt)hb(σ−t ) + Υ(st). (1.4)
The right hand-side is the borrowers’ available income. It consists of the endowment
of the perishable good y(σt), the value of housing stock net of the debt burden from
the previous period plus resources being redistributed from the financial sector to the
households, of which borrowers receive the amount Υ(st).
Financial Intermediaries. Intermediaries demand aggregate deposits S(σt) and sup-
ply aggregate debtD(σt). The real pay-offs for each unit lent are given by the real interest
rates, RD(σt) and R(σt), respectively. The collateral constraints and assumption 1 make
sure that debt is risk free. The key distortion in the intermediation sector is similar to
that in Cooper and Ejarque (2000).15 We assume that in each node σt only a fraction
of savings can be transformed into debt. This fraction is stochastic and depends on the
realization of the current shock only. That is, θ(σ−t z) = θ(z) and θ(z) : Z → (0, 1] is a
time-invariant function.
This exogenous financial shock represents a reduced form way to model the risk-bearing
capacity of the financial sector. In particular, changes in the intermediation technology θ
potentially reflect changes in the value of equity associated with a risky asset portfolio or
changes in monitoring by the bank managers as a consequence of changes in risk aversion.
Consequently, while we remain agnostic about the exact foundation of the θ, we point out
that the observed variations in the spread series in the period 2005-2009 mainly reflect
changes in the households’ price for risk rather than changes in the default risk.16
15Another example for the inclusion of a supply-sided friction in the banking sector into an international
macro model is Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Perri (2013).
16The inclusion of a more detailed micro-founded banking sector is an interesting avenue that we leave
for future research.
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Financial intermediaries are otherwise risk neutral and maximize expected profits on their
portfolio, that is,
max
D(σt),S(σt)≥0
RD(σt)D(σt)−R(σt)Si(σt) (1.5)
subject to the constraint
D(σt) ≤ θ(σt)S(σt). (1.6)
Because intermediaries operate in competitive markets with free entry, equilibrium inter-
est rates are such that intermediaries make zero profits:
RD(σt)θ(σt)−R(σt) = 0. (1.7)
This last relation implies that there is a spread between loan and deposit rates in this
economy . In particular, the interest rate on debt is always at least as big as the interest
rate on savings, or RD(σt) ≥ R(σt).
Transfers from the Banking sector to the Household sector. Completing the
description model, we specify the re-distribution function Υ(st). The intermediation pro-
cess as outlined above implies an aggregate intermediation loss in terms of real resources
that, in equilibrium, is given by (1− θ(σt))S(σt). This can be easily verified by combin-
ing the households budget constraints, using market clearing conditions in the debt and
savings markets, and the zero profit condition of financial intermediaries. The aggregate
resource constraint, then, reads as:
nbcb(σt) + nscs(σt) + (1− θ(σt))S(σt) = y(σt) + Υ(st)
On the left hand side, we have the borrowers’ and savers’ consumption plus the resources
‘eaten up’ by the financial sector. On the right hand side we have aggregate income plus
total transfers. In order to keep the intermediation process as a purely redistributive
distortion, we choose Υ(st) such that all resources ‘lost’ in the intermediation sector are
redistributed back to the agents, so that aggregate consumption is a function of aggregate
income only. Therefore, aggregate transfers are defined as follows:
Υ(st) ≡ (1− θ(σt))S(σt) (1.8)
We interpret this transfer as income generated by the intermediation sector that is redis-
tributed back to the households because they are either the managers of the bank or the
residual claimants on the portfolio revenues of the bank. The inclusion of the transfer
function has two advantages. The first is that any effect of a θ shock on house prices
and welfare comes through the effect on interest rates, and is not generated by an ag-
gregate loss of resources. The second advantage is computational, as the re-distribution
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of resources makes sure that aggregate consumption is a function of aggregate endow-
ment only, an essential requirement for the application of the concept of wealth recursive
equilibria proposed by Kubler and Schmedders (2003) to our framework.
1.2.2 Financial Market Equilibrium with Intermediation and
Houses as Collateral
The economy is a collection of period-by-period utility functions, impatience parameters,
state-dependent endowments and state-dependent financial intermediation efficiency, ag-
gregate transfers, transition probabilities, and the bankruptcy cost in case of default,
E =
(
u,
(
βi, yi, hi(σ−0 )
)
i=b,s
, θ,Υ,Π,m
)
.
Definition 1 A financial markets equilibrium for an economy E, initial housing stocks
(hi(σ−0 ))i=b,s and initial shock z0 is a collection(
(h¯b(σt), d¯b(σt), c¯b(σt)), (h¯s(σt), d¯s(σt), c¯s(σt)), (D¯(σt), S¯(σt)),
q¯(σt), R¯D(σt), R¯(σt), Υ¯(σt)
)
σt∈Σ
satisfying the following conditions:
(1) Markets clear for all σt ∈ Σ:
nbh¯b(σt) + nsh¯s(σt) = 1
D¯(σt) + nbd¯b(σt) = 0
S¯(σt)− nss¯s(σt) = 0
(2) For borrowers,
(h¯b(σt), d¯b(σi), c¯b(σt)) ∈ arg max
cb≥0,hb≥0,db≤0
Ub(cb, hb)
such that for all σt ∈ Σ
cb(σt) + q¯(σt)hb(σt) + db(σt) ≤ y(σt) + db(σ−t )R¯D(σ−t ) + q¯(σt)hb(σ−t ) + Υ¯(σt)
R¯D(σt)db(σt) +m · E[q¯(σtz)|σt]hb(σt) ≥ 0
(3) For savers,
(h¯s(σt), s¯s(σi), c¯s(σt)) ∈ arg max
cs≥0,hs≥0,ss≥0
Us(cs, hs)
such that for all σt ∈ Σ
cs(σt) + q¯(σt)hs(σt) + ss(σt) ≤ y(σt) + ss(σ−t )R¯(σ−t ) + q¯(σt)hs(σ−t ) + Υ¯(σt)
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(4) For financial intermediaries
(D¯(σt), S¯(σi)) ∈ arg max
D≥0,S≥0
R¯D(σt)D(σt)− R¯(σt)S(σt)
such that for all σt ∈ Σ
D(σt) ≤ θ(σt)S(σt)
(5) Free entry for financial intermediaries
R¯D(σt)D¯(σt)− R¯(σt)S¯(σt) = 0
(6) Per-capita transfers are given by
Υ¯(σt) = (1− θ(σt))S¯(σt)
1.2.3 Wealth Recursive Equilibria
For the quantitative exercise, we define a wealth recursive formulation in the spirit of
Kubler and Schmedders (2003). Since we have only two agents, the relative wealth of one
agent, defined by a single value on the unit interval, uniquely define the complement of
the other agent relative wealth; the borrowers’ beginning-of-period wealth-share is :17
ωb(σt) =
q(σt)hb(σ−t ) +RD(σ−t )d(σ−t )
q(σt)
(1.9)
Note that the collateral constraints, the constraints on asset holdings, and the utility
functions satisfying Inada-conditions, together with assumption 1, imply that the wealth
share lies in the unit interval, ωb ∈ [0, 1]; by definition, ωs = 1 − ωb. The equilibrium
policy function is then a function of the discrete exogenous state variable z and the
financial wealth distribution is Ω = (ωb, 1− ωb).
As we solve for an equilibrium numerically, we follow Kubler and Schmedders (2003)
and compute -equilibria.18 For the approximation of the equilibrium policy functions
we adopt the time-iteration algorithm with linear interpolation proposed by Grill and
Brumm (2010). That is, we approximate the equilibrium policy on a fine grid for the
borrowers’ wealth share. For points outside the grid we use linear piecewise interpolation.
See appendix A.2 for a detailed description of the algorithm.
17Here, we used the market clearing conditions for the housing, debt, and savings markets and the
fact that financial intermediaries make zero-profits in equilibrium, so that hb(σ−t ) + hs(σ−t ) = 1 and
RD(σ−t )db(σ−t ) +R(σ−t )ss(σ−t ) = 0.
18For a definition and interpretation of -equilibria, we refer to the original text.
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1.3 Quantitative Analysis
This section studies the quantitative effects of the Great Recession on house prices and
households’ welfare. The Great Recession is modeled as contemporaneous negative shocks
to both aggregate income and financial intermediation (mortgage rate spread). In this
way, our simulation is driven by the empirical facts that motivated our research question.
The next subsection outlines our calibration strategy. We then have a short section on
the long-run stationary wealth distribution and we present our quantitative results on
welfare effects.
1.3.1 Calibration
In the benchmark calibration, we assume an elasticity of substitution between houses and
consumption equal to 1, so that ρ = 0. Risk aversion is set equal to γ = 2. These are
standard values used in the literature. In general, it is not straightforward to calibrate
these parameters as macro and micro evidence span a relatively large sets of parameter
estimates. As in (Glover, Heathcote, Krueger, and Ríos-Rull, 2011), the risk aversion γ is
the crucial parameter for the elasticity of house prices with respect to aggregate shocks.
The elasticity of substitution between consumption and savings plays an important role
for the elasticity of welfare gains/losses to changes in the wealth distribution. Therefore,
in section 1.4, we provide a sensitivity analysis for different values of the risk aversion
parameter and allow for some substitutability between housing and non-durable con-
sumption as recently found by Bajari, Chan, Krueger, and Miller (forthcoming). Notice
that one period in the model corresponds to one quarter in the data.
The parameter φ is the expenditure share of non-durable consumption. We pick the value
to match the average housing wealth over GDP in the data during the period 1998-2007.
For aggregate housing wealth, we used the sum of the value of owner occupied real estate
of private households plus the residential housing wealth of non-financial non-corporate
private business. The savers’ discount factor βs is set so that the average interest rate
on savings in the model matches the average return on savings, equal to 1.5% during
1998 - 2007 (at annualized level). The borrowers’ discount factor βb and m are jointly
calibrated to match the average wealth share of the borrowers and the leverage ratio of the
borrowers. Since there is not necessarily a one-to-one mapping between the parameters
and their targets, we follow an iterative procedure to find values for βs, βb, m and φ. That
is, we first guess values for the parameters and then compare the computed moments to
their counterparts in the data. If they do not match, we change the values and repeat
until they do. The procedure leads to a quite satisfactorily match between model and
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Table 1.2: calibration
Parameter Value Model Data Target Source
Preferences
γ 2 Benchmark value from literature
ρ 0 Benchmark value from literature
φ 0.97 196% 196% Average housing value over GDP (annual-
ized) 1998 - 2009
βs 0.996 1.5% 1.5% Average return on savings (annualized)
βb 0.988 11.7% 11.3% Borrowers’ financial wealth share (SCFav-
erage 1998-2009)
m 0.5 45% 44.4% Borrowers’ leverage ratio (SCF average be-
tween 1998-2009)
Relative population size
nb 0.42 42% 42% Share of borrowers (SCF average 1998-
2009)
Intermediation shock
piθH 0.565 56.5% Probability of low spreads during 1998-
2009:II
ρθ 0.868 0.868 0.868 Autocorrelation of spreads during 1998-
2009:II
θL 0.9985 1.8 % 1.75 % Average spread during 1998-2009:II (annu-
alized)
θH 0.99207 1.27 % 1.27 % Standard deviation of spread during 1998-
2009:II (annualized)
Income shock
piyH 0.85 15% 15% Probability of recession 1980- 2009:II
(NBER dates)
piyLL 0.8 5 quarters 5 quarters Average duration of recession (NBER
dates) 1980- 2009:II
yL 0.9572 5% 5% Average Peak to trough drop in GDP 1980-
2009:II
yH 1.0076 Normalization E(y) = 1
data moments.19
19The variable definitions used to calculate the data moments are as close as possible to the definition
of the model counterparts. For a detailed description of how we compute the relative wealth share and
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The relative population size of borrowers is set to 42%, corresponding to the fraction
of borrowers in the SCF when using the weighted average share of households with a
negative net asset position as defined in appendix A.1. This estimate is in line with the
calibration in Iacoviello (2008).
The stochastic processes for the exogenous state variables yt and θt are assumed to be
independent. This is in line with the correlation in the data.20 We assume that both
aggregate income and the intermediation spread shock take two values each, that is
yt = {yL, yH} and θt = {θL, θH}. For the intermediation shock, we assume that the
transition probabilities are given by:
piij = (1− ρ)pij + δijρ for i, j = H,L
where δij = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise; pij > 0 is the unconditional probability of being in
state j, and by definition we have ∑j pij = 1. The parameter ρ governs the persistence of
the shock.21 The unconditional probability of a high intermediation efficiency, P (θ = θH),
is set to 0.565, the fraction of quarters in which the U.S. experienced low spreads between
1998:I and 2009:II. We set θL = 0.99207, θH = 0.9985, and ρθ = 0.868 so that we match
the mean, standard deviation and the autocorrelation of the spreads in the data (for the
data counterparts see table; for a description of the data see appendix A.1).
For the income shock, we choose yH and yL to match the mean, normalized to E(y) = 1,
and an average peak-to-trough drop in GDP of 5% during a recession. The conditional
probability of the low realization of y being in a recession today piyLL is chosen to match
an average duration of a recession equal to five quarters. This is in line with the NBER
recession dates between 1980:I and 2009:II. The transition probability of the high income
realization conditional on high income today, piyHH = 1 − (1 − piyLL)1−pi
y
H
piyH
, is obtained by
setting the unconditional probability of a recession equal to 15% (piH = 0.85). This is in
line with NBER recession dates between 1980:I and 2009:II.
To summarize, the exogenous state space is then given by Σ = {(yH , θH), (yL, θH),
(yH , θL), (yL, θL)} and - given the assumption that income and intermediation processes
are uncorrelated - the transition matrix for the exogenous process is just the Kronecker
product of the individual transition probability matrices for the income shock and the
intermediation shock. Table 1.2 summarizes the calibrated parameter values and the
targets.
the leverage ratio in the data, see appendix A.1.
20We also conducted a VAR analysis for GDP growth and spreads for different lag-lengths and orderings
and found no evidence for significant spillover terms and no contemporaneous correlations between GDP
and mortgage spreads. Only in one specification (VAR of order two), the null of a Granger-causality
of output growth on spreads is rejected, though the coefficients for individual lags of output were not
significantly different from zero.
21See Backus, Gregory, and Zin (1989) and Mendoza (1991)
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1.3.2 Stationary wealth distribution
Figure 1.3: Wealth distribution
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Figure 1.3 shows the long-run stationary wealth distribution simulated over one million
time periods.22 Recall that the wealth distribution across agents is entirely summarized
by the borrowers’ fraction of wealth ωb. On average, the borrowers hold 11.7% of the
total wealth of the economy (which is equal to the value of housing q). The distribu-
tion of the borrowers’ wealth share is concentrated around the mean and has a spike
to the right at around 12.6%, which correspond to states of the world when there is a
long period of credit and income expansion. In these states, the borrowers’ collateral
constraint is binding and the interest rate on borrowing is relatively low; demand for
housing is high and expected house prices are therefore high. This marginally relaxes
the constraint, so that aggregate debt and savings are high. Because house prices are
rising and borrowers are accumulating housing, their wealth share increases. Conversely,
negative realizations of aggregate shocks make the borrowers’ wealth share drop. We will
explain these mechanisms in detail in the following section(s).
22Because of the simple persistence rule used to discretize the exogenous processes, the high number
of simulation periods makes sure that the exogenous processes have the same stochastic properties as
their data counterparts.
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1.3.3 Welfare effects in the Great Recession
We now turn to our main quantitative exercise, the estimation of welfare effects of the
Great Recession. For this purpose we construct an event window around the Great
Recession. We define the Great Recession as a state of the world with low income and
high spreads that is preceded by a state of the world where income is high and spreads are
low (i.e. intermediation is high). We then go along the equilibrium path of the simulated
economy and select all sequences that match these criteria. In figure 1.4, we plot the
average of selected realizations over all sequences including ten quarters preceding the
crisis and ten quarters after the crisis. We compare the Great Recession to two counter-
factual scenarios. First, we ask what would happen if spreads were low before and stayed
low during the recession (this corresponds to the long dashed line in 1.4 which we label as
low-spreads series). This experiment helps us to compare the welfare effects of a negative
income shock when leverage is high or low before the shock realizes. Second, we look at a
recession that occurs when spreads where already high before and during the crisis (short
dashed line in figure 1.4 which we label as high-spreads ). By comparing this scenario,
with the Great Recession, we calculate the welfare effects of de-leveraging in the crisis.
Panel (a) and (b) show the evolution of income and mortgage spreads. In all scenarios,
income first increases previous to the recession and then drops by 5 percent in period 0
when the recession hits. In the Great Recession, mortgage spread first decreases towards
its lowest value in period −1 and then jump to 3.5 percent in period 0. In the low-spreads
counterfactual scenario spreads decline and stay in their lowest realization in periods −1
and 0 and then return towards their long-run mean, around 1.75 percent per annum.
Similarly in the high-spreads counterfactual scenario, spreads increase slowly previous to
the recession, peaking at 3.5 percent p.a. in period 0 and then return slowly towards
their long-run mean. From panel (c) it is evident that house-prices are clearly driven
by aggregate income and not by mortgage spreads. Mortgage spreads, however, have
an important impact on the borrowers’ leverage ratio, defined as end-of-period leverage
or LEoPt = − dtqthbt ; when spreads are low, borrowers leverage up by increasing their debt
holdings faster than their housing wealth. This means they move towards the constraint.
In our simulation, in the pre-crisis, leverage peaks at around 50 percent. When spreads
increase in period 0, it becomes too costly for borrowers to roll-over their mortgages and
de-leverage sharply so that the constraint gets slack. This is reflected by the multiplier
associated with the collateral constraint that drops to zero. The time-path of leverage
looks quiet different under the other two counterfactual scenarios. In the low-spreads
case, borrowers stay leveraged also in period 0 and then de-leverage slowly following the
path of spreads. In the high-spreads case, aggregate leverage is already low previous to
the negative income shock and borrowers are pushed towards the collateral constraint
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Figure 1.4: Great Recession (solid line) versus different intermediation regimes
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in period 0 when house prices fall. This is because borrowers search to smooth the
recession by borrowing up to the limit (which is tighter because the house price drops
in the recession). This is also reflected by the increase in the multiplier on the collateral
constraint shown in panel (e). Therefore, shocks to financial intermediation affects the
borrowers’ leverage ratio through the relative price of debt (the mortgage spread). Panels
(f) and (g) show the paths for housing wealth for borrowers and savers, respectively. This
figures illustrate the following. If mortgage spreads would have stayed low during the
recession (low-spreads case), borrowers would have lost less in terms of housing wealth
than in the benchmark scenario, whereas savers would have lost more housing wealth.
The movements in leverage and housing wealth are reflected by the evolution of borrowers’
wealth share, shown in panel (h). In this panel the solid line shows drop much more than
the the long-dashed line. Importantly the wealth share recovers much slower after the
Great Recession compared to the case when mortgage spreads would have stayed low
during the crisis. This means that borrowers negative wealth shock is quite persistent
in the Great Recession. Finally, panels (i) and (j) show the corresponding welfare gains
for the two type of households (in consumption equivalents relative to long-run expected
utility, for a formal definition see next paragraph). Borrowers lose the most in the Great
Recession while savers lose the least when compared to the other counterfactual scenarios.
Note that only after two or three quarters, savers’ expected life-time utility becomes
positive and stays persistently above zero. This indicates substantial redistributive forces
that is connected to the discussion about the borrowers’ relative wealth share.
These findings are quantitatively formalized in table 1.3. The table compares the model
predictions with the data (we observe the on-impact change in house price, the change
in housing wealth for borrowers and savers in the period 2007-2009) and - in addition
- shows the average change in borrowers’ wealth share and the welfare gains/losses in
the recession for the two types of households, denoted by λb and λs, respectively. We
define welfare gains in two ways. First, we define welfare gains of the recession as the
compensation that is needed to make agents indifferent between the expected life-time
utility in period −1 (i.e. the quarter that precedes the recession) and expected life-time
utility in period 0 (i.e. the quarter when the recession hits). Negative numbers therefore
reflect welfare losses of the recession. We refer to these numbers as ‘on-impact welfare
gains’. Second, we report welfare gains of the expected life time-utility that agents have
7 periods23 after the recession relative to the average expected life-time utility, that is∑4
σ=1 piσVi(ω(σ), σ) for i = b, s.24 Also in this case we report the welfare gains in percent
of total consumption compensation that is needed to make agents indifferent between the
two alternatives. We refer to this second type as ’welfare gains after 7 periods’.
23The recent recession lastet 7 quarters according to NBER recession dates.
24The probability piσ is the unconditional (or stationary) probability that state σ ∈ Σ occurs.
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Table 1.3: Welfare effects of a recession (5 percent drop in income) for different spread
regimes
∆q ∆(qhb) ∆(qhs) ∆ωb λb λs
Data -11 -16 -9 ? ? ?
On impact, relative to pre-recession peak
Great Recession -9.18 -29.47 -2.65 -1.19 -0.60 -0.01
Low spreads -8.59 -16.42 -6.07 -1.10 -0.50 -0.03
High spreads -9.00 -8.34 -9.15 -0.68 -0.41 -0.05
After 7 periods, relative to long-run mean
Great Recession -1.29 -9.54 1.00 -0.78 -0.24 0.03
Low spreads -1.01 -0.56 -1.13 -0.55 -0.15 0.01
High spreads -1.37 -8.79 0.69 -0.54 -0.18 0.02
Notes: Column two shows the percentage change of the house price between date −1 and date 0, the period of the recession.
Column three and four tabulate the percentage change in housing wealth between date −1 and 0 for borrowers and savers,
respectively. Column four tabulates the absolute change of the borrowers’ wealth share between date −1 and date 0
(in percentage points). Columns six and seven show the welfare gains of the recession in total consumption equivalents
(relative to expected utility in period −1) for borrowers and savers, respectively. The Great recession is defined as a
contemporaneous drop in income and financial intermediation (i.e. high spread) in period 0. The counterfactuals in row
three (four) assume that financial intermediation is high (low) in both periods −1 and 0.
Based on figure 1.4 and table 1.3 we can summarize the following two key findings:
1. High leverage makes the borrowers’ wealth share more sensitive to house price
changes.
2. A negative intermediation shock, when coupled with a negative income shock, re-
sults in higher (smaller) welfare losses for borrowers (savers).
Result 1 says that the higher the leverage ratio in the economy when entering a recession,
the more the wealth gets distributed away from borrowers to savers. In other words, a
given house price drop due to an aggregate income shock leads to more bigger wealth losses
for borrowers to savers when there is more leverage prior to the shock. If the economy is
experiencing high intermediation efficiency previous to a recession, the leverage ratio of
borrowers will be high. The borrowers’ wealth share will then be very sensitive to price
changes.
Result 2 deals with the second question raised in the introduction: whether a larger re-
distribution of wealth translates into more inequality in terms of welfare. We find that
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this crucially depends on whether the collateral constraint binds. That is, whether bor-
rowers wish to stay up against the constraint, or move away from it. This result implies
that the wealth loss from a recession only translates into a larger (smaller) welfare loss for
borrowers (savers) when there is a simultaneous deterioration in the efficiency of financial
intermediation. In particular, when spreads would have stayed low during the recession,
shown in row three, the borrowers’ welfare gain would have been 17 percent higher com-
pared to the Great Recession. Savers would have lost three times more compared to
the Great Recession. The intuition for both results is summarized in the following two
paragraphs.
Intuition for Key Result 1 Let us now show the intuition behind these results graph-
ically. To see the effects on the wealth distribution, we can rewrite the borrowers’ wealth
share in terms of the leverage ratio:
wb,t = hb,t−1(1− LBoP (qt)) (1.10)
where LBoP (qt) = −RD,t−1db,t−1qthb,t−1 denotes the beginning of period leverage carried over
from last period, evaluated at the house price of the current period.25 Taking the total
derivatives of the wealth share around qt = qt−1, one can see that the growth rate of
the borrowers’ wealth share is proportional to the growth rate of house prices and the
proportionality factor is a function of leverage:
dwb,t
wb,t
= L(q)1− L(q)
dq
q
.
If financial intermediation efficiency is low and spreads are high, leverage is likely to be
small and a given drop in house prices translates into a smaller drop in wealth. In other
words, when borrowers’ leverage is high, any aggregate price drop makes borrowers - on
impact - relatively poorer in terms of wealth.
Of course, the price today is an equilibrium outcome; that is, the pricing function depends
on the state of the economy. We have no closed form solution for this pricing function
but we can plot the equilibrium house prices as a function of the wealth share using the
simulated economy. This function is - for any realization of the exogenous shock z ∈ Z -
decreasing in wb, or
q = Q(wb, z)
∂Q
∂wb
< 0. (1.11)
25Note that by assumption 1, LBoP (qt) is strictly smaller than one. This can be seen by the following.
When leverage is high, most likely the collateral constraint is binding. Using the collateral constraint from
last period and substituting it into the definition of beginning-of-period leverage, one obtains mEt−1(qt)qt .
By assumption 1 and verified ex-post along the equilibrium path, this object is smaller than one.
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Given the promised value of previous-period debt, RD,t−1db,t−1, and given the housing
stock carried over from last period, hb,t−1, the equilibrium wealth share in period t is
implicitly defined by the solution to (1.10) and (1.11), or
wb,t = hb,t−1
(
1 + RD,t−1db,t−1
Q(wb,t, zt)hb,t−1
)
(1.12)
Figure 1.5: Response of equilibrium wealth share to a negative income shock, for previ-
ously high (solid lines) versus low intermediation (dashed lines)
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Notes: The figure plots the left-hand side (45 degree line) and the right hand side of equation (1.12) as a function of the
borrowers’ wealth share wb and for different intermediation regimes. The solid lines show the right-hand side under the
assumption that hb,t−1 and RD,t−1db,t−1 are relatively high (in absolute value) because of high financial intermediation.
Given the assumption on debt and housing, point AH materializes if income stays high whereas AL is the wealth share
when income drops to yL. The dashed line shows the right-hand side under the assumption that hb,t−1 and RD,t−1db,t−1
are relatively low, that is for low intermediation. In this scenario, BH is the wealth share that materializes when income
stays high, whereas the wealth share drops to BL when income falls to yL
Figure 1.5 plots the left-hand side and right hand side of equation (1.12) as a function of
the borrowers’ wealth share wb for different income realizations and for given assumptions
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on the level of debt and housing level. The solid line plots the right-hand side of equation
1.5 under the assumption that value of debt and housing stock in t − 1 are relatively
high (i.e. intermediation efficiency was high), while the dashed line assumes that debt
and housing stock carried over from the previous period are low (i.e. financial efficiency
was low).26 When the previous period debt is high (solid line), the wealth share is more
sensitive to exogenous shocks to income (drop from point AH to AL) compared to the
case when debt carried over from last period is relatively low (drop from BH to BL). This
illustrates the relationship between leverage and wealth dynamics during a recession: the
effect comes from a different elasticity of wealth with respect to changes in prices which,
in turn, depend on the aggregate state of financial intermediation.
Intuition for Key Result 2. Result (2) relates to combined income and negative
intermediation shock. When house prices fall and there is a contemporaneous negative
intermediation shock, borrowers face a higher interest rate on debt, which prevents them
from rolling over the debt and moving away from the collateral constraint. This forces
the borrowers to substantially decrease their stock of housing.
Figure 1.6 plots the borrowers’ housing stock policy function for high and low interme-
diation efficiency (respectively solid and dashed line). Following the Great Recession,
the relative wealth of the borrower drops. As financial intermediation also drops during
the recession from high to low efficiency, the housing stock drops from A to C. This is
a substantially larger drop than would have occurred had the efficiency of intermedia-
tion stayed high. In this case, for the same drop in wealth, the decrease of the housing
stock would have been less sharp (from A to B). In other words, the elasticity of de-
mand for housing with respect to income shocks depends on the efficiency of the financial
intermediation sector.
Summary of the welfare effects. First, both agents lose in response to an aggregate
negative income shock, and borrowers always lose more than savers because they are
financially constrained and unable to cushion themselves from negative shocks. Second,
while borrowers experience a welfare loss in the case of a negative financial intermediation
shock, savers are virtually unaffected. Third, in the simulated recession, we observe that
the borrowers’ welfare loss is larger than the algebraic sum of the welfare losses in response
to negative income and intermediation shocks in isolation. The opposite is true for the
savers. This comes from a non-linearity in the reaction of consumption that comes when
borrowers are forced to de-leverage and move away from the collateral constraint. In such
26We set the respective values for housing stock and debt equal to the average value in period −1 of
the event window above for the respective intermediation regime.
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Figure 1.6: Equilibrium housing policy depends non-linear on wealth when financial
intermediation efficiency changes from high to low
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Notes: Solid line: housing policy as a function of the borrowers’ wealth share, conditional on high financial intermediation
efficiency. Dashed line: housing policy as a function of wealth, conditional on low financial efficiency. The vertical line
intersecting at A is the borrowers’ wealth share in a state with high income and high financial intermediation and the
vertical line intersecting at B is borrowers’ wealth share in the period when the Great Recession hits the economy.
a scenario savers can even gain from the joint income and intermediation shock (relative
to an income shock alone) because they become relatively wealthier.
This set of results leads to the conclusion that, following the Great Recession, while both
types of agents experienced a welfare loss, savers could cushion themselves from the nega-
tive impact of the negative aggregate shocks by substituting their savings for depreciated
houses. This conclusion, while qualitatively comparable with the recent findings of Hur
(2012), highlights a different mechanism. In this model, savers are able to cushion them-
selves from the negative effects of the Great Recession because of the asymmetric effects
of financial intermediation shocks and the high level of leverage prior to the shock.
An important remark relating to the magnitudes of the obtained welfare estimates con-
cerns the error analysis of our numerical algorithm. That is, if the mistakes agents
make using our algorithm are larger (in consumption equivalents) than the calculated
welfare gains/losses, these numbers would have no quantitative validity. We find that
26
Menno, Dominik (2014), Topics in quantitative macroeconomics 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12157
the maximum relative Euler Error of our approximation is 3e-5 (or -4.5 in log(10)-scale).
This implies that an agent, using our approximation of the equilibrium policy functions,
would lose 30 Dollars for each million spent. For details see appendix A.2.4. We therefore
conclude that our quantitative findings are valid and quantitatively meaningful.
1.3.4 Always binding collateral constraint
We solve the model employing a global solution method rather than the more widely used
log-linearization method. This is necessary in order to take into account the fact that
the collateral constraint is not always binding, but comes at the cost of a more complex
numerical implementation. In this section we show how large is the cost of assuming
always binding constraints in this framework.
To this end, we solve an alternative specification of the model by forcing the borrowers
to have an always-binding constraint. In this case, the leverage ratio of the economy is
always equal to mEt−1qt
qt
, which therefore needs to be re-calibrated for this specification
in order to match the leverage ratio we find in data. The results are summarized in table
1.4. Compared to the benchmark model, we find that in a version of the model with
always-binding collateral constraints: (i) the quantitative effects on house prices are larger
relative to the benchmark model for a negative financial intermediation shock; ii) in the
Great Recession, the welfare losses for borrowers (savers) are smaller (higher) in absolute
terms. To summarize, the borrowers’ welfare loss is lower by 0.07 percentage points (in
absolute terms), while the savers’ lose 0.04 percentage points more when compared to
the benchmark model. Most importantly, the non-linearity of previous-period leverage
completely vanishes, as the borrowers’ wealth losses and the agents’ welfare gains are just
the algebraic sum of the effects when the economy is hit with each shock separately.
The reason for these differences is that models with always binding constraint have the
peculiarity of a constant elasticity of demand for debt with respect to changes in interest
rate. In other words, following a spread shock, the borrowers’ change in next period’s debt
has to be strictly proportional to the present discounted value of the drop in next period’s
housing wealth. When debt is costly, borrowers are prevented from moving away from
the constraint. Aggregate debt moves less with respect to the benchmark case and this,
in equilibrium, reduces the savers’ ability to switch from savings to housing. This is the
reason why house prices drop more in response to a negative intermediation shock. The
elasticity of borrowers’ wealth share to any given drop in house prices is always constant
and given by mAB1−mAB , where the superscript stands for ’always binding’. Note that, in
order to match the average leverage ratio in the data, mAB = 0.45, which is lower than
m = 0.5 in the benchmark calibration. The elasticity of the borrowers’ wealth share is
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Figure 1.7: Great Recession in benchmark model (solid line) versus always binding con-
straint (dashed line)
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Table 1.4: Always binding collateral constraint
∆q ∆(qhb) ∆(qhs) ∆ωb λb λs
Data -11 -16 -9 ? ? ?
On impact, relative to pre-recession peak
Great Recession -9.44 -16.72 -7.43 -0.95 -0.54 -0.03
Low spreads -8.65 -14.83 -6.94 -0.86 -0.46 -0.04
High spreads -8.58 -15.17 -6.86 -0.88 -0.47 -0.04
After 7 periods, relative to long-run mean
Great Recession -1.16 -5.73 0.06 -0.56 -0.18 0.02
Low spreads -1.21 -2.91 -0.75 -0.23 -0.09 -0.00
High spreads -1.05 -7.83 0.76 -0.83 -0.25 0.03
Notes: Column two is the change in house prices between period -1 (the period just before the shock occurs) and period 7
(following the start of the recession). Column three shows borrowers’ start-of-period leverage ratio, defined as LBoPb,t in the
period of the shock t = 0; note that this leverage ratio is a function of the price today only (variables with subscript t− 1
are given numbers). Column four shows the corresponding change in borrowers’ financial wealth share between period -1
and period 7. Column five reports the borrowers’ end-of-period leverage ratio, defined as LEoPt after the Great Recession
- in period t = 7. Columns six and seven show the welfare gains/losses of borrowers and savers, respectively. All numbers
are in percent.
therefore constant, and is strictly less than one. This result suggests that the assumption
of always-binding collateral constraints is not innocuous when making a welfare analysis.
1.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we compare the quantitative implications of changing the elasticity of
substitution between housing and non-durable consumption, and the coefficient of risk
aversion. Note that, for all changes in these parameters, we re-calibrate the rest of the
parameters that in order to match the targeted data moments. This allows us to compare
the relative performance of each parameterization with the benchmark case.
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1.4.1 Elasticity of substitution between housing and non-durable
consumption
Here we conduct a sensitivity analysis for one of the two parameters that we fixed in the
benchmark calibration to unity: the elasticity of substitution between housing and non-
durable consumption. Table 1.5 summarizes the quantitative findings for a higher level
of substitutability between housing and non-durable consumption, setting ρ = 1.25.27
Table 1.5: Welfare effects in model with higher elasticity of substitution between housing
and non-durable consumption
∆q ∆(qhb) ∆(qhs) ∆ωb λb λs
Data -11 -16 -9 ? ? ?
On impact, relative to pre-recession peak
Great Recession -9.10 -38.87 -0.34 -1.19 -0.57 -0.02
Low spreads -8.54 -17.83 -5.78 -1.12 -0.49 -0.03
High spreads -9.09 -6.71 -9.51 -0.47 -0.35 -0.06
After 7 periods, relative to long-run mean
Great Recession -0.96 -12.92 1.88 -0.82 -0.23 0.03
Low spreads -1.05 0.92 -1.52 -0.64 -0.16 0.02
High spreads -1.52 -11.74 0.90 -0.34 -0.13 0.00
Table 1.5 shows that, with increasing substitutability between housing and non-durable
consumption, house prices (and therefore wealth) react more strongly to an intermediation
shock when compared to the benchmark case. This, like in the case with the always-
binding constraint, results in a decreased elasticity of demand for debt with respect
to changes in the interest rate for borrowing. In addition, the Great Recession leads
to smaller (bigger) welfare losses for borrowers’ (savers’) in this calibration. Borrowers
are hurt less because they substitute housing for non-durable consumption, which is
less painful when these goods are substitutes. This is also the reason why there is less
redistribution in terms of welfare from borrowers to savers. Though, in absolute terms,
savers lose more. Nevertheless, the key findings relating to the role of leverage in wealth
dynamics and the role of the intermediation shock in a recession are unchanged.
27This parameter value is taken from Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2007), who consider a represen-
tative agent framework with housing; As mentioned earlier in the paper, an elasticity of substitution
larger than one between housing and non-durable consumption has also recently been found by Bajari,
Chan, Krueger, and Miller (forthcoming).
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1.4.2 Risk aversion
In this section we show quantitative analyses of Great Recession episodes for different
values of the risk aversion parameter taken from the related literature. In particular,
while the business cycle literature usually features a log-separable utility function with
elasticity of substitution and risk aversion equal to unity, the macro-finance literature
and recent contributions on the distributive effects of the Great Recession focus on a
broader set of parameter values for risk aversion.28 Table 1.6 summarizes the effects
of the simulated Great Recession for the benchmark and other model specifications for
different values of the risk aversion parameter.
Table 1.6: Welfare effects of the Great Recession, different risk aversion parameters
∆q ∆(qhb) ∆(qhs) ∆ωb λb λs
Data -11 -16 -9 ? ? ?
On impact, relative to pre-recession peak
γ = 1 -5.25 -22.52 -0.04 -0.60 -0.47 -0.04
γ = 2 (benchmark) -9.18 -29.47 -2.65 -1.19 -0.60 -0.01
γ = 3 -12.80 -35.83 -4.84 -1.84 -0.73 0.02
γ = 5 -19.21 -37.31 -14.21 -2.33 -1.09 0.04
After 7 periods, relative to long-run mean
γ = 1 -0.91 -6.95 0.72 -0.37 -0.15 0.01
γ = 2 (benchmark) -1.29 -9.54 1.00 -0.78 -0.24 0.03
γ = 3 -1.38 -11.79 1.62 -1.21 -0.32 0.05
γ = 5 -1.40 -12.91 1.44 -1.52 -0.51 0.07
As in Glover, Heathcote, Krueger, and Ríos-Rull (2011), the higher is the coefficient of risk
aversion, the higher is the negative impact of a recession on equilibrium aggregate house
prices. The the observed drop in the house price during the Great Recession is consistent
for a risk aversion parameter between 2 and 3. The welfare analysis also confirms that
bigger wealth shocks (due to the drop in house prices) translate into larger negative
welfare effects for borrowers. This effect is again amplified by financial intermediation
28Glover, Heathcote, Krueger, and Ríos-Rull (2011) set the risk aversion equal to 3 in the benchmark
case, and then conduct a sensitivity analysis. They find that the magnitude of equilibrium price responses
increase non-monotonically as risk aversion increases. Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2007), in a capital
asset pricing model with housing, find that a model featuring a higher level of risk aversion better
performs in matching the moments of housing returns.
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shocks, which make it more difficult to smooth negative income shocks. In contrast, savers
are more able to cushion themselves from the negative effects of the Great Recession. The
intuition is the same as in the benchmark model. Following the reduction in aggregate
debt, savers are able to reallocate their portfolios from savings towards housing (when
it is relatively cheap). Consequently, the higher is the coefficient of risk aversion, the
smaller are the overall welfare losses for savers.
1.5 Conclusions
Using a dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to the US economy, we evaluate
the quantitative effects of (i) aggregate income shocks and (ii) shocks to financial inter-
mediation on house prices and on the welfare of two types of agents: leveraged agents
(borrowers) and non-leveraged agents (savers).
The quantification of welfare costs associated with the US Great Recession along this
cross-section complements recent contributions (Glover, Heathcote, Krueger, and Ríos-
Rull, 2011; Hur, 2012) and adds a new mechanism stemming from shocks to the capital
market. Our set-up is well suited for the evaluation of the welfare consequences of credit
supply shocks in a recession, and complements other recent studies by exploring the effects
of financial intermediation shocks in a model with endogenous collateral constraints.
We find that, following a shock modeled on the Great Recession, all the agents in the
economy experience a welfare loss, and borrowers always lose more than savers. This
finding comes from the fact that savers, being unconstrained, change their portfolio al-
locations and smooth the negative shock by buying the deflated asset (housing). We
find that a financial intermediation shock that occurs in a recession forces borrowers to
de-leverage, and amplifies the re-distribution from savers to borrowers, which translate
in higher welfare losses for the latter.
Finally, we find that, in a model where borrowers are always borrowing constrained, the
non-linearity in the amplification mechanism coming from the financial intermediation
shock vanishes, and the effects on wealth and welfare are smaller.
We provide a number of sensitivity checks. While the redistributive effects (both in
terms of financial wealth and welfare) between borrowers and savers are decreasing in the
substitutability between housing and non-durable consumption, the drop in house prices is
bigger when risk aversion is stronger, leading to a proportional increase in redistribution.
Although the paper focuses on the distributive effects of the Great Recession on borrowers
and savers, we do not explicitly consider the possibility that borrowers can default on their
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debt obligations. While this could potentially benefit borrowers at the expense of their
creditors, empirical evidence suggests that this feature of the U.S. Great Recession was
restricted to a subset of borrowers, the sub-primers, who are not explicitly modeled here.
Adding this third form of heterogeneity to the analysis is, in our opinion, an interesting
avenue for future research.
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Chapter 2
Multinational Firms and Business
Cycle Transmission
2.1 Introduction
A central question in international macroeconomics is how financial integration affects
the international transmission of shocks. The literature on international business cycles
has extensively analyzed the effects of financial assets, such as bonds or firm equity,
on the long-run average implications of financial integration on international business
cycles.1 In terms of empirics, the literature typically focuses on the link between financial
integration and output co-movement and is silent about investment co-movement.2 This
seems somewhat surprising because one robust prediction of the standard international
real business cycle model is the strong negative co-movement of investment when financial
markets become more integrated.3 In terms of theory, the literature does not distinguish
foreign direct investment (FDI) from other financial assets in regard of its consequences
for international business cycle co-movement. Yet, FDI is special in that it involves
technology flows within boundaries of multinational firms.4 In this paper I attempt to
make some progress along both the empirical and the theoretical dimension.
1Previous work includes Baxter and Crucini (1995), Kehoe and Perri (2002), Heathcote and Perri
(2002). For a theoretical argument that the causality is reverse, see Heathcote and Perri (2004).
2Previous work includes Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005), Imbs (2006), and Hsu, Wu, and Yau (2011).
3See for example Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992), Baxter and Crucini (1995), Kehoe and Perri
(2002).
4See McGrattan and Prescott (2009), McGrattan and Prescott (2010), Ramondo and Rappoport
(2010) and references therein.
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Empirical contribution. The main empirical contribution is to document that in-
creases in bilateral FDI linkages are associated with more investment synchronization.
This is a potential channel through which multinationals affect international business cy-
cles that has been overlooked so far. In the benchmark regressions, I use a panel data-set
of bilateral FDI linkages and data on GDP and investment synchronization for the G7
countries over the period 1991 - 2006. I explicitly exclude the recent crisis period because
I do not want to have the results to be driven by a few observations.5
I also document that the link between FDI linkages and output synchronization is sta-
tistically indistinguishable from zero. This complements earlier work, as previous studies
are inconclusive on this issue. The literature that focuses on FDI integration tipically
finds a positive effect of financial integration on GDP synchronization.6 On the other
hand, a recent strand of literature focusing on banking integration suggests that the link
between financial integration and business cycle co-movement is negative in normal times
and positive in times of financial crisis.7
Theoretical contribution. From a theoretical perspective, my contribution is to build
a dynamic stochastic equilibrium model of foreign direct investment. For this purpose,
I embed technology capital and multinational production into a stochastic two-country
real business cycle environment. The first objective of the model is to illustrate a con-
crete mechanism through which exogenous changes in FDI openness affect business cycle
synchronization, in particular investment synchronization, and to study how this mech-
anism works both under shocks to country-specific aggregate productivity and shocks to
multinational activity. The second purpose of the model is to conduct counter-factual
analyses in order to shed light on what is driving the weak link between FDI integration
and GDP synchronization as found in the data. Measured GDP is distorted because
intangible investments by multinationals are expensed. Due to this mismeasurement, I
show that the actual elasticity of output co-movement with respect to FDI openness is
significantly higher than suggested by measured GDP. Third, I use the model to assess
the risk sharing implications when FDI openness increases. I show that even when fi-
nancial markets are complete, FDI integration reduces the consumption risk to which
households are exposed. This reduction is strongest in the model with country-specific
shocks only. Shocks to multinational activity, on the other side, mitigate the risk-reducing
effect of more FDI because production in both countries is increasingly determined by
5In fact, business cycle correlations jumped up since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, see Perri
and Quadrini (2011).
6See, for example, Imbs (2004) and Hsu, Wu, and Yau (2011).
7See Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydró (2013) and Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Perri
(2013).
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shocks to multinationals. This last result is the dynamic version of proposition 1 in Ra-
mondo and Rappoport (2010) who consider a static multi-country environment.8 To the
best of my knowledge, I am the first one to make this point in a fully dynamic business
cycle framework. This finding also complements Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Perri
(2013) where the beneficial effects of more banking integration are mitigated by increasing
exposure to global banking shocks.
The theory embeds features from the models studied in McGrattan and Prescott (2009)
and Ramondo and Rappoport (2010) into a dynamic stochastic real business cycle frame-
work. As in McGrattan and Prescott (2009), multinationals accumulate technology cap-
ital. This type of capital can be used simultaneously in different plants located both
at home and abroad. Similar to Ramondo and Rappoport (2010), multinationals’ pro-
ductivity is subject to stochastic shocks and these shocks apply to all production units
the multinational operates, both within and across country borders. By allowing for
multinational-specific shocks, the multinationals itself act as a source of business cycles
volatility - on top of affecting the propagation of country-specific shocks that originate in
other sectors of the economy. In what follows, I consider different model versions (with
and without multinational-specific shocks) that help to disentangle the role played by each
model ingredient for the link between FDI openness and business cycle co-movement.
The model is also related to a growing strand of literature that stresses the importance of
intangible capital for economic outcomes, such as asset prices (Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou,
2013), managerial compensation (Lustig, Syverson, and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2011), or the
life-cycle of firms (Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005).9 More closely related, Johri, Letendre,
and Luo (2011) study the role of organizational capital for international investment co-
movement; their model, however, abstracts from foreign direct investment and is therefore
not suited to study the transition to FDI openness.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reports the empirical methodology and the
empirical results. Section 2.3 introduces the theoretical framework. Section 2.4 presents
the quantitative results. Section 2.5 looks at the model implications for aggregate con-
sumption risk and international correlations of consumption and hours worked. Section
2.6 concludes.
8The different layers of production in their economy is very similar to the one considered here. They
do, however, abstract from investment in technology capital.
9These studies focus on organizational capital only whereas I adopt the broader definition of technol-
ogy capital by McGrattan and Prescott (2009) that includes Brands, R&D, and organizational capital.
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2.2 Empirical results
2.2.1 Empirical specification
The empirical model is given by
synchai,j,t = θt + γFDIi,j,t−1 + z′i,j,tβ + ci,j + ui,j,t for a = GDP, I. (2.1)
where synchai,j,t is a time-varying bilateral measure reflecting the synchronization for
growth in gross domestic product (a = GDP ) and investment (a = I), respectively,
between countries i and j in period t. One period in the regression setup is one year. The
variable FDIi,j,t−1 measures bilateral cross-border FDI positions between country i and j
in the previous period (year) and ci,j is a country-pair specific unobserved heterogeneity
that captures all time-invariant bilateral factors that affect both FDI integration as well
as business cycle and investment synchronization.10 I also include time dummies (θt) to
account for shocks common to all countries. Following Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and
Perri (2013), in order to separate the relative importance of global and country-specific
shocks, I also report results for specifications where only country-specific time trends (gi
and gj) and where both aggregate and country-specific time trends are included:
synchai,j,t = θt + (gi + gj) · t+ γFDIi,j,t−1 + z′i,j,tβ + ci,j + ui,j,t for a = GDP, I.
The vector z′i,j,t contains measure for trade linkages in and the product of the countries’
income per capita and the countries’ population. In addition, following the literature, I
control for industrial specialization by taking the sum of each sectors’ shares in total value
added over all sectors.11 All controls are lagged by one period to reduce the problem of
potential endogeneity issues.
Following Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Perri (2013), I measure business cycle syn-
chronization (synchGDPi,j,t ) by the negative absolute distance in output growth rates be-
tween country i and country j in quarter t:
synchGDPi,j,t ≡ − |(lnGDPi,t − lnGDPi,t−1)− (lnGDPj,t − lnGDPj,t−1)| . (2.2)
Analogously, cross-country investment synchronization in quarter t is defined as
synchIi,j,t ≡ − |(ln Ii,t − ln Ii,t−1)− (ln Ij,t − ln Ij,t−1)| . (2.3)
10Other studies have stressed the importance of country-pair fixed effects, see Kalemli-Ozcan, Pa-
paioannou, and Peydró (2013) and Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Perri (2013).
11See Imbs (2006).
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
N Mean Sd Min Max p25 p50 p75 p95
G7 countries
Pairwise corr. of hp-filtered GDP 336 0.373 0.434 -0.811 0.968 0.105 0.479 0.725 0.895
Pairwise corr. of hp-filtered Investm. 336 0.265 0.425 -0.848 0.969 -0.0418 0.297 0.607 0.883
Synch. of GDP 336 -2.317 1.192 -7.617 -0.332 -2.929 -2.076 -1.446 -0.872
Synch. of Investm. 336 -7.463 3.620 -25.12 -0.378 -9.335 -6.911 -4.845 -2.724
FDI/GDP 336 2.106 2.064 0.0729 11.45 0.504 1.524 3.147 6.449
FDI/total FDI 336 5.594 5.133 0.270 22.73 2.009 4.072 6.943 18.06
Trade/GDP 336 1.817 1.692 0.240 6.309 0.515 1.000 3.218 5.480
Trade/total trade 336 4.708 4.706 0.395 20.83 1.594 3.080 6.679 14.95
All country pairs
Pairwise corr. of hp-filtered GDP 640 0.365 0.427 -0.811 0.968 0.0949 0.451 0.727 0.888
Pairwise corr. of hp-filtered Investm. 640 0.263 0.417 -0.848 0.969 -0.0326 0.302 0.583 0.881
Synch. of GDP 640 -2.501 1.427 -9.315 -0.187 -3.197 -2.129 -1.477 -0.898
Synch. of Investm. 640 -9.191 6.122 -42.54 -0.378 -11.13 -7.792 -5.090 -2.757
FDI/GDP 640 3.170 5.923 0.0466 54.70 0.475 1.492 3.491 10.77
FDI/total FDI 640 6.382 7.983 0.0762 50.92 1.400 4.072 8.050 19.14
Trade/GDP 640 1.721 1.749 0.0628 7.738 0.475 0.808 2.970 5.492
Trade/total trade 640 3.722 3.973 0.126 20.83 1.099 2.185 5.392 11.10
Notes: The table shows the descriptive statistics of the balanced sample for 40 country pairs from 1991 to 2006. The
pairwise correlations of GDP and investment are the correlation of hp-filtered real GDP and real gross fixed capital
formation, respectively, estimated using 20 quarter-rolling-windows. The GDP and investment synchronization indices
are defined in equations (2.2) and equation (2.3), respectively. The indices are computed on a quarterly basis and then
transformed into yearly observations by taking the average over four quarters. The synchronization indices are in percent
(annualized); FDI and trade ratios are defined in equations (2.4) and (2.5), the unit is percent. For a data description and
a list of country pairs included in the sample see appendix B.1.
The yearly estimates for aggregate and investment synchronization are obtained by av-
eraging over the quarterly synchronization measures. As a robustness check, appendix
B.2 reports estimates where the dependent variables are cross-country correlations of
hp-filtered investment and GDP, respectively.
I measure cross-border FDI linkages in two ways. First, I use the sum of bilateral asset
and liabilities between countries i and j over the sum of the two countries’ GDP in each
year:12 (
FDI
GDP
)
i,j,t
≡ FDIAi,j,t + FDILi,j,t + FDIAj,i,t + FDILj,i,t
GDPi,t +GDPj,t
. (2.4)
Second, I use bilateral FDI assets and liabilities divided by the sum of total FDI assets
and liabilities of the two countries:13(
FDI
TotFDI
)
i,j,t
≡ FDIAi,j,t + FDILi,j,t + FDIAj,i,t + FDILj,i,t
FDIAi,t + FDILi,t + FDIAj,t + FDILj,t
. (2.5)
The sample for the empirical analysis in the main text consists of the 21 G7 country
12See Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Perri (2013).
13I also normalized bilateral FDI positions using total foreign assets and liabilities, finding similar
results.
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pairs for the years between 1991 and 2006. For a data description see Appendix B.1.
The appendix also confirms the estimation results for a wider set of country pairs, using
a balanced panel with 40 country pairs from 1991 to 2006.14 Table 2.1 reports the
descriptive statistics for the relevant variables in the sample.
2.2.2 FDI linkages and investment synchronization
This section reports the findings on the relation between FDI integration and international
investment synchronization. Table 2.2 reports the benchmark estimates on the relation
between FDI integration and investment synchronization for the G7 countries for the
period 1991- 2006. The specification in column (1) controls for country-pair fixed effects
and country specific time trends. The coefficient is positive and statistically different
from zero. That is, conditional on country specific shocks, within country-pair increases
in FDI integration are associated with more synchronized investment. In column (2), I
include time fixed-effects to account for common global shocks, while column (3) reports
results with time fixed-effects and country-specific time trends. In all specifications but
specification (2), the coefficient on FDI integration is positive and statistically different
from zero. In column (4), I control for bilateral trade linkages.15 The coefficient on goods
trade is positive and similar in magnitude as the coefficient on FDI integration. Yet we
cannot reject the Null of a zero coefficient. Most importantly, when controlling for goods
trade does not affect the coefficient on FDI integration.16
To get a sense for the magnitudes, note that FDI linkages are expressed in logs and
investment synchronization is in percentage points, hence the coefficients reflect semi-
elasticities. The coefficient in column (3) implies that a doubling in bilateral integration
(e.g., when moving from the 50 percent percentile to the 75 percent percentile of FDI
linkages) is associated with an average increase in investment synchronization of 1.8
percentage points. Given the median investment synchronization is equal to -7.5 percent
for the G7 countries these are economically large effects.
Columns (5) to (8) report the results using the alternative FDI integration index as
14The reason for using the restricted sample is data availability. For these country pairs there are no
missing values for bilateral FDI positions and we have a balanced sample. Using the full (unbalanced)
sample with 18 countries from 1985 to 2006 does not alter the main conclusions. Appendix B.2 reports
additional estimation results and robustness checks.
15Similar to FDI linkages, bilateral trade is defined as the log of the sum of bilateral trade flows divided
by the sum of the countries’ GDP.
16Earlier work (e.g. Frankel and Rose (1998) or Kose and Yi (2006)) showed the importance of trade
for aggregate business cycle co-movement. The positive point estimates suggest the existence of some
complementarity between FDI and trade. Yet, the trade linkages are only moving slowly over time, so
there might be too little within-country correlation to pick up significant effects.
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Table 2.2: Bilateral FDI Linkages and Investment synchronization, G7 country pairs
Dependent Variable: Investment growth synchronization (annualized)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FDI/GDP 1.538* 0.537 1.752** 1.716**
(1.85) (1.24) (2.62) (2.78)
Trade/GDP 0.525
(0.25)
FDI/Total FDI 0.492 0.635 1.430** 1.544***
(0.59) (1.33) (2.42) (2.90)
Trade/Total Trade -1.315
(-0.61)
Country-pair fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Country trends Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
R-squared (within) 0.160 0.357 0.387 0.387 0.154 0.358 0.385 0.385
Observations 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315
Notes: The table reports panel (country-pair) fixed-effect coefficients estimated over the period 1991 to 2006 for the 21 G7
country pairs. The dependent variable is minus one times the absolute value of the difference in quarterly growth rate of
aggregate investment between country i and j in year t (the yearly estimate is obtained by averaging over the respective
four quarterly estimates). In columns (1) - (4) FDI integration is measured by the log of the share of the stock of bilateral
Foreign Direct Investment Assets and Liabilities between countries i and j in the previous year relative to the sum of
the two countries’ GDP in the previous year (denoted FDI/GDP). In columns (5) - (8) FDI integration is measured by
the log of the share of the stock of bilateral Foreign Direct Investment Assets and Liabilities between countries i and j
in the previous year relative to the sum of the two countries’ total FDI Assets and FDI Liabilities in the entire world in
the previous year (denoted FDI/Total FDI). All specifications also include the log of the two countries’ per capita GDP,
the log of the product of the two countries’ population, and the log of the industrial specialization index as defined in the
appendix; all controls are included with one period lag. The specification in (4) includes the log of the share of bilateral
export and import flows between countries i and j in the previous year relative to the sum of the two countries’ GDP in
the previous year (Trade/GDP). The specification in (8) includes the log of the share of bilateral export and import flows
between countries i and j in the previous year relative to the sum of the two countries’ total exports and imports in the
previous year (Trade/Total Trade). The specifications in columns (1) and (5) include country-specific linear time-trends.
The specifications in columns (2) and (6) include time fixed-effects. The specifications in columns (3),(4),(7), and (8)
include time fixed-effects and country-specific linear time-trends. Standard errors adjusted for panel (country-pair) specific
auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity and corresponding t-statistics are reported below the point estimates. A † denotes
significance at the 85% confidence level, * denotes significance at the 90% confidence level, ** denotes significance at the
95% confidence level, *** denotes significance at the 99% confidence level. For a detailed data description see appendix
B.1.
defined in equation (2.5). The results are similar to the ones presented in columns (1) to
(4). More FDI linkages are associated with higher investment synchronization; the point
estimates are somewhat lower than the ones in specifications (1) to (4).
The estimated coefficients are robust to a number of robustness checks. In particular,
using the full unbalanced sample for all available country pairs from 1985 to 2006, re-
stricting the sample to the balanced sample of 40 country-pairs between 1991 - 2006, or
using as a dependent variable the cross-country correlation of hp-filtered investment does
not change the main results: higher FDI linkages are associated with more investment
synchronization and the effect is economically large. Appendix B.2 contains more details
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Table 2.3: Bilateral FDI Linkages and GDP synchronization, G7 country pairs
Dependent Variable: GDP growth synchronization (annualized)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FDI/GDP 0.617** 0.108 0.317 0.346
(2.26) (0.69) (1.28) (1.41)
Trade/GDP -0.421
(-0.74)
FDI/Total FDI 0.447† 0.0763 0.207 0.222
(1.57) (0.47) (0.80) (0.86)
Trade/Total Trade -0.172
(-0.29)
Country-pair fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Country trends Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
R-squared (within) 0.179 0.343 0.365 0.366 0.172 0.343 0.363 0.363
Observations 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315
Notes: The table reports panel (country-pair) fixed-effect coefficients estimated over the period 1991 to 2006 for the 21
G7 country pairs. The dependent variable is minus one times the absolute value of the difference in quarterly growth
rate of real GDP between country i and j in year t (the yearly estimate is obtained by averaging over the respective four
quarterly estimates). In columns (1) - (4) FDI integration is measured by the log of the share of the stock of bilateral
Foreign Direct Investment Assets and Liabilities between countries i and j in the previous year relative to the sum of
the two countries’ GDP in the previous year (denoted FDI/GDP). In columns (5) - (8) FDI integration is measured by
the log of the share of the stock of bilateral Foreign Direct Investment Assets and Liabilities between countries i and j
in the previous year relative to the sum of the two countries’ total FDI Assets and FDI Liabilities in the entire world in
the previous year (denoted FDI/Total FDI). All specifications also include the log of the two countries’ per capita GDP,
the log of the product of the two countries’ population, and the log of the industrial specialization index as defined in the
appendix; all controls are included with one period lag. The specification in (4) includes the log of the share of bilateral
export and import flows between countries i and j in the previous year relative to the sum of the two countries’ GDP in
the previous year (Trade/GDP). The specification in (8) includes the log of the share of bilateral export and import flows
between countries i and j in the previous year relative to the sum of the two countries’ total exports and imports in the
previous year (Trade/Total Trade). The specifications in columns (1) and (5) include country-specific linear time-trends.
The specifications in columns (2) and (6) include time fixed-effects. The specifications in columns (3),(4),(7), and (8)
include time fixed-effects and country-specific linear time-trends. Standard errors adjusted for panel (country-pair) specific
auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity and corresponding t-statistics are reported below the point estimates. A † denotes
significance at the 85% confidence level, * denotes significance at the 90% confidence level, ** denotes significance at the
95% confidence level, *** denotes significance at the 99% confidence level. For a detailed data description see appendix
B.1.
on these robustness checks.
2.2.3 FDI Linkages and GDP synchronization
In this section, I present the results of the benchmark estimations for the relation between
integration and business cycle correlation. Table 2.3 reports the benchmark estimates
on the effect of FDI linkages on GDP synchronization in the period 1991- 2006. In
column (1), controlling for country-pair fixed effects and country specific time trends,
the coefficient is positive and statistically different from zero. That is, conditional on
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country specific shocks, within country-pair increases in FDI integration are associated
with more synchronized investment. However, this result is not robust to the inclusion of
an aggregate time trend. In column (2), I include time fixed-effects to account for common
global shocks, while column (3) reports results with both time fixed-effects and country-
specific time trends. In both specifications, the coefficient on FDI integration remains
positive but is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Specification (4) controls for
bilateral trade linkages. The coefficient on goods trade is positive and bigger in size than
the coefficient on FDI integration. Yet we cannot reject the Null of a zero coefficient.17
From the table also emerges that controlling for goods trade does not affect the finding of
a quantitative small and statistical insignificant link between FDI integration and GDP
synchronization.
Columns (5) to (8) report the results using the alternative FDI integration index as
defined in equation (2.5). The results are similar to the ones in columns (1) to (4), except
that in specification (8) the coefficient on trade linkages becomes statistically significant
at the 10 percent level. The results regarding FDI integration and GDP synchronization
remain unchanged: there is no statistical significant link between FDI linkages and GDP
synchronization.
2.3 A model of international business cycles with for-
eign direct investment
In this section, I develop a model of international business cycles where multinationals
accumulate technology capital and engage in FDI. Technology capital is firm-specific and
can be simultaneously used in multiple plants in locations at home and abroad.18 The
plants operatad by multinationals thus produce all with the same technology capital.
There are two types of shocks causing economic fluctuations: a standard country-specific
productivity shock and a shock that is multinational-specific, affecting the efficiency of
the existing technology capital. This multinational-specific shock therefore affects both
the returns on domestic and on foreign investment.
The model serves three purposes. The first is to precisely lay out a causal link between
FDI openness and international investment synchronization. The empirical section doc-
uments a relationship between the two, but does not speak about the underlying mech-
17A reason for this finding could also be reverse causality: less correlated country pairs engage in more
FDI. In this case, the presented coefficients presented here are lower bounds as this argument describes
a downward bias for the un-instrumented estimates. For the theoretical argument, see (Heathcote and
Perri, 2004).
18For the concept of locations in this context refer to McGrattan and Prescott (2009).
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anism and the direction of causation. I will use the model to derive quantitative results
that show how the empirical findings are indeed consistent with the hypothesis that FDI
openness has significant effects on investment synchronization. The second purpose of
the model is to shed light on the weak link between FDI openness and GDP synchro-
nization, as documented in the empirical section. For this purpose, I measure GDP in
the model in the same way as in national accounts data where investments in intangi-
ble capital are expensed. With the quantitative results of the model, I show that FDI
openness has indeed weak effects on business cycle synchronization when using measured
GDP as a proxy for aggregate activity. Third, and relatedly, I use the model to conduct
a counter-factual analysis to show that the relation between FDI openness and busi-
ness cycle synchronization is significantly stronger when aggregate output is measured
correctly.
The framework combines earlier work from Ramondo and Rappoport (2010) and Mc-
Grattan and Prescott (2009) to incorporate multinational production into an interna-
tional business cycles set-up. The main innovation is that I consider both a stochastic
environment and allow for an explicit role for FDI; as such, the set-up is well-suited to
analyze the effects of cross-border FDI integration on investment synchronization. As
will be shown below, a key ingredient of the model is the accumulation of technology
capital.
2.3.1 The economy
I consider a two-countries, two-sectors, two-goods world. In each country (foreign vari-
ables are denoted by an asterisk), there are households of equal mass normalized to unity
that consume a tradable final consumption good and supply labor to firms. Firms in the
final good sector buy intermediate inputs from intermediate good firms, hire labor, accu-
mulate physical capital and pay wages and dividends to domestic households. Physical
capital and labor are not mobile across countries but across sectors. The intermediate
good is not tradable across countries and producers in this sector buy differentiated goods
from domestic and foreign firms, labelled multinationals. Multinationals can accumulate
physical capital in both countries and set up production units both at home and abroad
through which they serve the foreign intermediate goods market. Multinationals pay
dividends to their owners, domestic multinationals are entirely owned by domestic house-
holds and foreign multinationals are entirely owned by foreign households.19 In addition
to physical capital, multinationals accumulate technology capital. Technology capital is
19I exclude that firm shares are traded. Because financial markets are complete this is without loss of
generality.
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firm-specific and can be used in multiple locations in both countries at the same time.
For international financial markets, I consider two scenarios: one in which international
financial markets are complete in the sense that households have access to a full set of
state-contingent securities that can be traded internationally. The other scenario is one
in which households cannot trade any international assets and just receive labor income
and dividends from domestic firms and multinationals.
Time and uncertainty. Time is discrete and denoted by t = 1, 2, . . .. In each period
t the economy experiences one event st ∈ S where S is a possibly infinite set. I denote
by st the history of events up to and including date t. The probability at date 0 of any
particular history st is given by pi(st). For the sake of readability (and with some abuse
of notation), I will drop the explicit reference to histories and states most of the time
when there is no room for confusion; I will use the subscript t instead to refer both to
the time period and histories.
Households. Households supply labor and the total supply of time is normalized to L¯;
households derive utility from consumption of the perishable good Ct and from leisure
L¯−Lt. Households maximize the expected discounted sum of future period utilities given
by
E
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, L¯− Lt)
where E represents expectations across all possible states of the world, Ct denotes con-
sumption, Lt is labor effort, 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, and the period-by-period
utility function is given by U(Ct, L¯ − Lt) = log(Ct) + α log(L¯ − Lt). Given aggregate
wages wt, households receive labor income wtLt and dividend payments from domestic
tradable good firms dTt and from multinationals dMt, respectively.
International financial markets. I consider two versions of the model, one with
complete international financial markets and one with financial autarky, in the sense that
households cannot trade any international assets.
1. In the complete financial markets scenario, households have available a complete
set of Arrow securities. Let Bt(st, st+1) be the quantity of bonds purchased by the
home households at time t after history st that pay one unit of the consumption
good in t+ 1 if and only if the state of the world economy in t+ 1 is equal to st+1.
Let qt(st, st+1) be the price of such a bond. Under complete international financial
markets, the budget constraint for the representative household in the home country
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is
Ct +
∑
st+1
qt(st, st+1)Bt(st, st+1) = wtLt + dTt + dMt +B(st−1, st) (2.6)
and the budget constraint for foreign households is analogously defined.
2. Under financial autarky, households are not allowed to trade any financial as-
set across country borders. In this model version, the budget constraint for the
representative household in the home country is
Ct = wtLt + dTt + dMt, (2.7)
analogous for the foreign households.
Firms in the tradable goods sector. The tradable consumption good is produced
under perfect competition with a constant returns to scale technology that combines
labor (lTt), capital (kTt) and the composite intermediate good (Xt). Production in the
this sector is subject to stochastic and country-specific productivity shocks at and a∗t .
Firms’ production function is given by
Yt = eat
(
kθT tl
1−θ
T t
)ν
X1−νt , (2.8)
where 0 < ν < 1. Final good firms purchase Xt units of the intermediate good from
competitive intermediate good producers at a unit price Pt, where I normalized the price
of the tradable good to one. Firms’ dividends are thus given by
dTt = eat
(
kθ1tl
1−θ
1t
)ν
X1−νt − PtXt − wtlTt − iTt (2.9)
where i1t represents investment in physical capital. The capital stock evolves according
to
kTt+1 = (1− δ)kTt +
χ1
(
iTt
kTt
)1−ψ
1− ψ + χ2
 kTt (2.10)
where δ is the depreciation rate, ψ determines the sensitivity of the cost to investment,
and the parameters χ1 and χ2 are set by imposing steady state targets.20 I assume that
the productivity shocks follow a bivariate auto-regressive processat
a∗t
 = Λa
at−1
a∗t−1
+
 εat
εa
∗
t
 (2.11)
20This functional form is widely used in the literature, see for example Quadrini and Jermann (2012).
The parameters are chosen such that the depreciation rate is equal to δ and that the derivative of capital
with respect to investment is equal to one.
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where Λa is a 2×2 matrix and [εat , εa∗t ]′ is a vector of i.i.d. random variables with mean 0,
standard deviation σa and correlation ρaε . The problem of domestic tradable goods firms
is then
maxE
∞∑
t
QtdTt
subject to (2.9), (2.10), k10 given, where Qt = βtUc(Ct, Lt) is the marginal utility of period
t consumption of domestic consumers who are the owners of the firm. The problem of
tradable good firms in the foreign country is analogous.
Intermediate good producers. Intermediate good producers buy non-tradables pro-
duced by multinationals and sell the bundled good YIt at price Pt to final good producers.
The index YIt aggregates a continuum of intermediate goods with a constant elasticity
of substitution 11−η . As discussed in more detail below, I assume that there are only two
types of firms in each country: (i) domestic multinationals and (ii) foreign multinationals.
Given this assumption, intermediate good producers’ output reads as
YIt =
[∫
xt(i)η
] 1
η
(2.12)
where xt(i) denote the intermediate good producers’ demand for goods produced by
domestic and foreign multinationals, respectively. The implied demand functions are
given by
xt(i) = (Pt/pt(i))
1
1−η . (2.13)
The main effect of adding imperfect competition to the model is that it scales up the
amount of variable profits in the economy; hence, it scales up the size of the payments
owners receive from technology capital, something that does not affect the qualitative
implications of the model but is necessary to obtain realistic amounts of FDI when un-
dertaking the quantitative analysis below.
Multinationals. In both countries, there is a large number of firms, labelled multina-
tionals because of their ability to potentially produce both at home and abroad. The
mass of firms is constant and normalized to one.21 In each country, there is a large
number of locations where production can take place.22 The measure of locations is,
21We do abstract from entry and exit considerations. One should think of it in the following way. If
a domestic multinational wants to enter the domestic market, it has to buy the product or market by
an existing multinational that has to exit. In that way, the mass of firms active stays constant. Please
also note that we do not allow domestic firms to buy other firms’ assets or product lines. This is an
interesting future line of research.
22The derivation of the multinationals’ production technology follows closely McGrattan and Prescott
(2009); see also Kapicka (2012).
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without loss of generality, normalized to one. In each location, both domestic and foreign
multinationals can set up a plant and operate. The production of a plant owned by
a domestic multinational in a given location i depends on firm specific productivity zt,
labor services lt(i) and physical capital kt(i) and is given by a decreasing returns to scale
technology yt(i) = ezt(kt(i)θlt(i)1−θ)1−φ with 0 < φ < 1. While physical capital and labor
are both specific to each multinational and plant, technology capitalMt and productivity
zt is specific to each multinational only. The productivity of the foreign multinational
is denoted by z∗t . Technology capital and productivity therefore affect production in all
locations, both domestic and foreign, in which the firm operates. A home multinational
with Mt units of technology capital, kdt units of domestic physical capital, and ldt units
of domestic labor services efficiently allocates physical capital and labor across all Mt
domestic plants. Therefore, its total production in the home country is given by
ydt = eztMφt
(
kθdtl
1−θ
dt
)1−φ
. (2.14)
Technology capital can also be used to set up operations in a foreign location. Foreign
owned multinationals accumulate domestic physical capital and hire domestic labor ser-
vices and use their own technology capital. In contrast to domestic firms, the production
of a foreign multinational depends on the countries’ FDI openness. The degree of open-
ness to FDI for both countries is given by a parameter τ that determines the total average
factor productivity of a foreign multinational relative to a domestic multinational.23 To il-
lustrate this point, consider a multinational owned by the domestic consumer with given
technology capital Mt and productivity zt. It allocates efficiently its foreign physical
capital kft and foreign labor services lft to generate total output abroad given by
yft = τeztMφt
(
kθftl
1−θ
ft
)1−φ
. (2.15)
Analogously, a foreign owned multinational with M∗t units of technology capital and pro-
ductivity z∗t , k∗ft units of home country’s physical capital, and l∗ft units of home country’s
labor services produces total output in the home country according to
y∗ft = τez
∗
t (M∗t )φ
(
(k∗ft)θ(l∗ft)1−θ
)1−φ
. (2.16)
The domestic multinationals’ total dividends are then given by the proceeds from their
domestic and foreign operations, respectively, or
dMt = (pdtydt − wtldt − idt) + (p∗ftyft − w∗t lft − ift)− iMt (2.17)
where the inverse demand functions pdt, p∗ft of domestic and foreign intermediate good
producers defined in (2.13) are taken as given; idt and ift represent investment in do-
mestic and foreign physical capital, respectively, and iMt represents the multinationals’
23Here, we impose symmetry across countries and assume that both countries have the same degree
of openness.
47
Menno, Dominik (2014), Topics in quantitative macroeconomics 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12157
investment in technology capital. The respective capital stocks evolve according to
kjt+1 = (1− δ)kjt +
χ1
(
ijt
kjt
)1−ψ
1− ψ + χ2
 kjt j = d, f (2.18)
Mt+1 = (1− δm)Mt +
χm1
(
iMt
Mt
)1−ψm
1− ψm + χ
m
2
Mt (2.19)
where δm is the depreciation rate of technology capital, ψm determines the sensitivity
of the cost to investment in technology capital, and the parameters χm1 and χm2 are
set by imposing steady state targets.24 Note that the parameters for the adjustment
costs in physical capital are identical across sectors. To complete the description of the
multinationals problem, I assume that the log of domestic and foreign multinationals’
productivity evolves according to a bivariate auto-regressive processzt
z∗t
 = Λz
zt−1
z∗t−1
+
 εzt
εz
∗
t
 (2.20)
where Λz is a 2× 2 matrix and [εzt , εz∗t ]′ is a vector of i.i.d. random variables with mean
0, standard deviation σz and correlation ρz. Multinationals resident in the home country
solve
maxE
∞∑
t
QtdMt
subject to (2.13),(2.17), (2.18), (2.19), M0, kd0, kf0 given, where Qt again is the marginal
utility of consumption of the domestic consumers (who are the owners). The problem of
foreign owned multinationals is analogous.
2.3.2 Equilibrium
An equilibrium, for an exogenously given level of FDI openess τ , is a collection of price
sequences pdt, p∗dt, pft, p∗ft, Pt, P ∗t , Qt, Q∗t , q(st, st+1) ∀st+1 ∈ S, exogenous shock processes
zt, z
∗
t , at, a
∗
t and quantities Ct, Lt, iTt, idt, ift, iMt, lTt, ldt, lft, dt, xdt, xft, ydt, yft, Xt,
YIt, Yt, B(st, st+1), C∗t , L∗t , i∗Tt, i∗dt, i∗ft, i∗Mt, l∗Tt, l∗dt, l∗ft, d∗t , x∗dt, x∗ft, y∗dt, y∗ft, X∗t , Y ∗It, Y ∗t ,
B∗(st, st+1) ∀st+1 ∈ S such that:
1. Given prices and shocks, consumers and firms solve their respective problems.
2. Labor markets clear, i.e.
Lt = ldt + l∗ft + lTt for all t.
L∗t = l∗dt + lft + l∗Tt for all t.
24I set the parameters such that the depreciation rate in steady state is equal to δm and the derivative
of technology capital with respect to investment is equal to one.
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3. Intermediate goods markets clear, i.e.
Xt = YIt X∗t = Y ∗It for all t.
xdt = ydt xft = y∗ft x∗dt = y∗dt x∗ft = yft for all t.
4. Under complete financial markets bond markets clear, i.e.
B(st, st+1) +B∗(st, st+1) = 0 for all t, st+1 ∈ S.
5. The tradable goods market clears, i.e.
Ct + C∗t + iTt + i∗Tt + idt + ift + i∗dt + i∗ft + iMt + i∗Mt = Yt + Y ∗t for all t.
2.3.3 National accounts and measured returns
Because in national accounts investment in technology capital is expensed,measured gross
domestic product in the home country is given by25
GDPt = Yt − iMt. (2.21)
This means that GDP differs from actual value added Yt whenever investment in tech-
nology capital is different from zero. This also implies that the dynamic properties of
GDP - in particular cross country correlations - depend both on output and investment
in technology capital.
Gross FDI positions are given by
FDIAt = kft FDILt = k∗ft
and total bilateral FDI linkages are computed in line with the empirical estimates26
FDI/GDP = 2(FDIAt + FDILt)4(GDPt +GDP ∗t )
.
In terms of measurement, other key variables are the returns on FDI. Returns reported
in balance of payment statistics e.g. by the BEA do not coincide with the actual returns
25The equation follows by adding up aggregate labor income wtLt, firms’ dividends and depreciation
of physical (or tangible) capital. The crucial assumption is that technology capital is intangible and
therefore not taking into account when computing aggregate income. See also McGrattan and Prescott
(2010).
26Note that quarterly GDP is annualized because in national accounts, quarterly gross domestic prod-
uct is reported at annualized levels.
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multinationals receive from foreign direct investment.27 To see this in the present setup,
consider the actual return domestic multinationals receive from their subsidiaries abroad
rft = θη(1− φ)
p∗ftyft
kft
− δ.
In the data, measured returns of foreign subsidiaries from the abroad are computed as
FDI income (dividends plus reinvested earnings) divided by the tangible capital stock
owned by the multinationals. In the notation of my model, measured returns for the
domestic multinational from its subsidiaries abroad are given by
rFDI,t =
p∗ftyft − w∗t lft − δkft
kft
= rft + (1− (1− φ)η)
p∗ftyft
kft
. (2.22)
As the returns on technology capital are not taken into account, measured returns differ
from the actual returns by the second term in the above expression. In order to calibrate of
the multinational-specific shock, I will match the volatility of measured returns pubilshed
by the BEA, as outlined in more detail in the next sub-section.
2.3.4 Calibration
The equilibrium described above does not admit an analytical solution. I therefore de-
rive a numerical solution using standard linearization techniques. For this purpose, I
need to assign numerical values to the various parameters. Table 2.4 shows the parame-
ters used in the calibration for the three model specifications considered: (1) the model
with complete financial markets and country-specific productivity shocks only, (2) the
model with complete financial markets with both country-specific productivity shocks
and mutlinational-specific shocks to the efficiency of technology capital, and (3) financial
autarky with both shocks.
The discount factor is set to β = 0.99 implying an average interest rate of 4 percent. The
share of intermediate inputs in final tradable production ν is set to 0.5, following Alvarez
and Lucas (2007).28 For the demand elasticity of substitution in the intermediate sector
I follow Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) and set η to 0.9, implying mark-up of 11 percent and
an elasticity of substitution of 10. For the depreciation of physical capital, I choose a
standard value and set δ equal to 0.025. Regarding the depreciation of technology capital,
27This was first pointed out by McGrattan and Prescott (2010).
28Even though in their model the only input in production is labor, the model is calibrated in a way
that is perfectly consistent to my setup, as they compute the share of effective labor which includes
capital.
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Table 2.4: Parameter values
Description Symbol Model
Complete
Markets
Complete
markets,
both
shocks
Financial
autarky,
both
shocks
Preferences
Discount factor β 0.99
Total time endowment L¯ 3
Weight of leisure α 1.602 1.602 0.955
Technology
Income share of labor in production θ 0.31
Share of intermediate goods in tradables ν 0.50
Income share of technology capital φ 0.21
Elasticity of demand interm. good sector 11−η 10
Degree of FDI openness τ 0.22 0.22 0.22
Deprectiation and adjustment costs
Depreciation physical capital δ 0.025
Depreciation technology capital δm 0.0375
Adjustment cost physical capital ψ 0.097 0.099 0.138
Adjustment cost technology capital ψm 0.090 0.095 0.122
Std. dev. prod. shock σa 0.008 0.004 0.008
Std. dev. techn. capital efficiency shock σz 0.000 0.015 0.011
Cross-country correlation prod. shock ρa = ρz 0.600 0.600 0.400
Autoregessive coefficients Λa = Λz
[
0.95 0
0 0.95
]
I use δm = 0.0375, implying an annual depreciation rate of 15 percent, that is, the BEA
estimate for depreciation of R&D capital.29
As outlined in the following paragraphs, the remaining parameters are chosen in order
to match key moments of the data. This includes also the parameters for the stochastic
processes because - even in the model with country-specific productivity shocks only
(at, a∗t ) - there is not a one-to-one mapping between the stochastic processes and the
29See Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013). Also McGrattan and Prescott (2010) or Kapicka (2012)
assume that technology capital depreciates faster than physical capital. For the main results of this
paper, this assumption is not crucial. The quantitative implications are affected but not sensitive for
reasonable perturbations of this parameter (between 0.01 and 0.15).
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Table 2.5: Targeted data moments and model fit
Data Model
Complete
Markets
Complete
markets,
both
shocks
Financial
autarky,
both
shocks
Long-run averages
Labor income share 64 64 64 64
Investment in technology capital
over GDP
8 8.0 8.0 8.0
FDI/GDP 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Second moments
Std. dev. of GDP 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Std. dev. of investment in physical
capital relative to GDP
3 3.0 3.0 3.0
Std. dev. of investment in technol-
ogy capital relative to GDP
3 3.0 3.0 3.0
Cross-country GDP correlation 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Std. dev. FDI returns 1.6 0.9 1.6 1.6
Notes: This table presents the target moments used for the calibration. I compare the moments in the data to the averages
of the models’ stationary distributions obtained by simulating 150000 time periods and dropping the first 50000. The
labor income share and returns on FDI are computed from US data, published by the BEA. The remaining data moments
are the median values across time and countries for the OECD sample, see table 2.1. For a detailed description of the
data see appendix B.1. Column two shows the data moments. Column three refers to the model with complete financial
markets and country-specific productivity shocks in the tradable sector only. Column four shows the implied moments
from the model with complete financial markets and both country-specific productivity shocks in the tradable sector and
multinational specific shocks to the efficiency of technology capital. Column five shows the moments for the model under
financial autarky and both shocks.
Solow residual obtained from the data because GDP is mismeasured. Table 2.5 reports
the data targets and the model fit.
Utility and production. The weight on leisure in the utility function α is set so that
households, on average, work one third of the available time. By normalizing the total
time endowment to L¯ = 3, this implies a long-run target for employment equal to one.
For the share of technology capital in multinationals’ production (φ), I follow McGrattan
and Prescott (2009) and match average investment in technology capital over GDP equal
to eight percent. The share of capital in production (θ) is then set so that in steady state
the labor share is 64 percent. The degree of FDI openness (τ) is set so that the bilateral
FDI position in the model - measured as in the data according to equation (2.4) - is equal
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to 1.7 percent, that is, the median value of bilateral FDI linkages in the data, shown in
table 2.1 row five, column seven.
Adjustment costs. Adjustment costs for both physical capital (ψ) and technology
capital (ψm), respectively, are set so that the hp-filtered investment series of both types
of capital are three times as volatile as hp-filtered GDP. For physical capital, this is a
standard value and consistent with OECD data. For technology capital, the number re-
quires some discussion. Ouyang (2011) reports that the growth rate of R&D expenditures
are 1.6 times as volatile as GDP growth rates; on the other hand, Eisfeldt and Papaniko-
laou (2013) find that the volatility of the investment rate in organizational capital is 1.5
percent (annual).30 Targeting the latter value would imply in this model that invest-
ment in technolgy capital was six times as volatile as GDP. Because I adopt the broader
definition of technology capital (marketing expenditures plus organizational capital plus
R&D) and R&D is the largest part in technology capital,31 I choose a value in between
and assume that investment in technology capital behaves similar to investment in phys-
ical capital in terms of volatility, in line with the findings in Wälde and Woitek (2004) for
R&D investment and G7 data. It is worth noticing that the selected adjustment costs on
investment in physical capital are quiet low compared to standard business cycle models;
the presence of technology capital makes investment in physical capital less volatile.
Exogenous shocks. For the stochastic processes I assume that the transition ma-
trices are the same Λa = Λz, with a value of 0.95 on the diagonals and zero on the
off-diagonals. Multinational-specific productivity shocks are perfectly correlated within
countries (all domestic multinationals have the same productivity) and not correlated
across countries (foreign multinationals’ productivity follows a statistically independent
stochastic process). The volatility of productivity in the tradable sectore (σa) and its
cross-country correlation (ρa) are set so that measured GDP in the model matches the
standard deviation of GDP in the data (1.3 percent) and the median value of the hp-
filtered cross-country GDP correlation in the data (0.5, see table 2.1), respectively. For
the model specifications with multinational-specific shocks (zt, z∗t ), I choose the volatility
σz such that the volatility of measured FDI returns as defined in equation (2.22) matches
the reported volatility in the data, equal to 1.6 percent annualized.32
30They define the investment rate as aggregate investment divided by the existing capital stock, see
Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) table II.
31See McGrattan and Prescott (2010).
32Note that the estimate in the data comes from the BEA and is the average over US inward and
outward FDI income (see data appendix for a description of the data).
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2.3.5 Impulse responses
This subsection presents the dynamic responses to the two types of shocks in separation.
This serves two purposes. First, I show in what respects multinational-specific shocks
differ from country-specific productivity shocks, in terms of model dynamics. Second,
this allows me to illustrate how the transmission of these two shocks changes as countries
open up to FDI. I therefore present both the impulse responses for country pairs with
relatively little FDI linkages (i.e. a low τ) and countries with large FDI linkages (i.e.
high τ).
Productivity shocks
Figure 2.1 shows the impulse responses to a positive productivity shock in the home
country’s tradable sector for value added, measured GDP, and investments in physical
and technology capital. Blue lines refer to the domestic country, the red lines to the
foreign country. Solid lines refer to a country pair that is relatively closed to FDI, dashed
lines refer to a relatively open country pair in terms of FDI.33 Three observations emerge.
First, both actual value added (panel a) and GDP (panel b) increase in the home country
while both show relatively little response in the foreign country. At the same time,
investment in physical capital (panel c) and investment in technology capital (panel d)
increase in the home country and fall in the foreign country; notably, the on-impact
increase of investments in the home country exceeds the fall in the foreign country by a
factor four.
Second, technology capital behaves differently to a domestic productivity shock when
countries are relatively more open to FDI (dashed lines); while the on-impact increase
in technology capital investment in the home country decreases from four to two and a
half percent, the response of foreign investment in technology capital switches sign and
actually turns positive. Hence, when countries are relatively more open to FDI, a positive
productivity shock in the home country benefits both domestic and foreign multinationals,
whose dividends increase. Because the shocks are persistent, the expected returns on
technology capital increase. Within a firm, in turn, all returns are equalized, therefore the
returns both on foreign and domestic investment (from the firms’ perspective) increase.
As a consequence, foreign multinationals invest not only more in technology capital, but
also more in physical capital both at home and abroad. On the other hand, because part
of the additional returns of the increased domestic productivity benefits foreign firms,
33For space considerations, the shock process itself is not shown. I consider a one-standard deviation
shock in period 1; all plotted responses are normalized by the standard deviation of the shock.
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Figure 2.1: Impulse responses to a productivity shock: low versus high bilateral FDI
linkages
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Notes: The figure shows impulse responses to a one-standard deviation positive productivity shock of one standard
deviation in the home country (εat ). All responses are in percentage deviations from the steady state, normalized by
the standard deviation of the shock. Solid lines refer to the relatively closed country pair (low τ), dashed lines refer
to the relatively open country pair (high τ). Blue lines refer to the home country, red lines to the foreign country.
Panel a) plots the impulse responses for value added (Yt and Y ∗t ) as defined in equation (2.8), panel b) for measured
GDP (defined as Yt − imt), panel c) for investment in physical capital (it = iTt + idt + i∗ft and i∗t = i∗Tt + i∗dt + ift),
and panel d) for investment in technology capital (iMt and i∗Mt).
domestic firms increase their investments by a smaller amount than it would be the case
when countries are relatively closed to FDI. The previous discussion is reflected by the
responses of countries’ aggregate investment in physical capital shown by the dashed lines
in panel c). The responses shift move closer together, meaning that domestic and foreign
investment become less negatively correlated.
Third, actual value added and measured GDP - shown in panels a) and b) - do quali-
tatively not respond differently when varying the countries’ openness to FDI (compare
the solid versus dashed lines). The only notable difference is the on-impact response in
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Figure 2.2: Impulse responses to a positive shock to multinational activity: low versus
high bilateral FDI linkages
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Notes: The figure shows impulse responses to a one-standard deviation positive shock to the efficiency of domestic
multinationals (εzt ). All responses are in percentage deviations from the steady state and normalized by the standard
deviation of the shock. Solid lines refer to the relatively closed country pair (low τ), the dashed lines refer to the
relatively open country pair (high τ). Blue lines refer to the home country, red lines to the foreign country. Panel
a) plots the impulse responses for value added (Yt and Y ∗t ) as defined in equation (2.8), panel b) for measured GDP
(defined as Yt − imt), panel c) for investment in physical capital (it = iTt + idt + i∗ft and i∗t = i∗Tt + i∗dt + ift), and
panel d) for investment in technology capital (iMt and i∗Mt).
measured GDP: because investment in technology capital responds less positive in the
home country compared to the closed case, GDP increases by more on impact (and the
reverse for the foreign country). The transition dynamics however are largely unaffected,
suggesting that GDP correlations become somewhat more negative with increasing FDI
integration.
56
Menno, Dominik (2014), Topics in quantitative macroeconomics 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12157
Shocks to multinational activity
Figure 2.2 shows the impulse responses to a positive shock to domestically owned multi-
nationals’ productivity (εzt ) for value added, measured GDP, and investments in physical
and technology capital, respectively. Blue lines refer to the domestic country, red lines
to the foreign country. The solid lines refer to a country pair that is relatively closed to
FDI, dashed lines refer to a relatively open country pair in terms of FDI.34
For relatively closed countries (solid lines) multinational-specific shocks work very much
like standard productivity shocks, moving all quantities in a similar fashion as described
in the previous sub-section. The reason is that in this case the share of foreign firms is
too small to affect aggregate quantities.
On the other hand, the picture changes when countries are relatively open to FDI (dashed
lines). First, consider the responses of investment in technology capital shown in panel d).
The dashed blue lines lies above the solid blue line, meaning that domestic multinationals
increase their investment in technology capital by more than in the closed economy case.
The reason is that domestic multinationals gain from investments in technology capital
because of the relatively higher returns from abroad. Similarly, the red dashed line lies
below the red solid line meaning that foreign multinationals investments in technology
capital decrease by more than compared to the case with low FDI linkages.
This, in turn, affects the profitability of investment in physical capital, so it is rational
for the multinationals to invest more at home and abroad. This is reflected by the
increase in aggregate investment both at home and abroad, as shown by the dashed
lines in panel c). Note that this also implies that the increase in investment in physical
capital in the home country is below the solid blue line in panel c) because part of
the resources get redirected to the foreign country. As a consequence, international
investment becomes more synchronized when countries are relatively open to FDI. Hence,
multinational-specific shocks exacerbate the effect of technology on the investment co-
movement.
Finally, consider the responses of value added in panel a) and GDP in panel b) in the high
FDI linkage scenario (dashed lines). The first notable observation is that value added
in both countries increase in response to the shock. The reason is that part of the re-
sources are shifted to the foreign country in form of additional investment of home owned
multinationals leading to more output abroad. This is also reflected by the less positive
response of value added in the home country (the dashed blue line lies below the solid
blue line). Measured GDP - as shown by the dashed lines in panel b) - reflects not only
34For space considerations, the shock process itself is not shown. I consider a one-standard deviation
shock in period 1; all plotted responses are normalized by the standard deviation of the shock.
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Table 2.6: Business cycle statistics
GDP Cons. Investm. Employm. Net
Exports
Volatilities relative to GDP volatility
Complete markets, prod. shock only 1.3† 0.47 3.0† 0.53 0.29
Complete markets, both shocks 1.3† 0.48 3.0† 0.53 0.30
Financial autarky, both shocks 1.3† 0.76 3.0† 0.26 0.11
Correlation with GDP
Complete markets, prod. shock only 0.83 0.96 0.93 0.41
Complete markets, both shocks 0.83 0.96 0.92 0.40
Financial autarky, both shocks 1.00 0.99 0.97 -0.90
International Correlation
Complete markets, prod. shock only 0.4† 1.00 0.19 -0.24
Complete markets, both shocks 0.4† 1.00 0.18 -0.27
Financial autarky, both shocks 0.4† 0.42 0.42 0.41
Notes: † denotes statistics matched in the calibration.
the movements of value added but also the responses in investment in technology capital.
Because domestic investment in technology capital responds relatively more when FDI
linkages are high, the impulse response of domestic GDP shifts towards South-East such
that it even crosses the response of foreign GDP. That means that - on impact - measured
GDP abroad increases by more than domestic GDP. In the subsequent transition then,
domestic GDP rises, while foreign GDP falls. This suggests that measured GDP might
get even more negatively correlated when FDI openness increase.
2.4 Quantitative Results
2.4.1 Business cycle properties
In this section, I use the model to assess the business cycle implications of technology
capital and shocks to multinational activity. For this purpose, I compare the long-run
business cycle statistics for the three model specifications. Table 2.6 reports the results of
the quantitative exercise. The rows labelled “Complete Markets, prod. shock only” report
business cycle statistics for the model with complete financial markets and productivity
shocks only; the rows labelled “Complete markets, both shocks” refers to the model with
complete markets and both productivity shocks and shocks to the efficiency of technology
capital; the rows labelled “financial autarky, both shocks” refer to the financial autarky
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model with both shocks.
There are three notable results. First, all model versions generates business cycle statis-
tics similar to those of standard international business cycle models which includes the
well known short-comings. The complete market models imply perfect cross-country cor-
relation of consumption, negative cross-country employment correlations, and pro-cyclical
net exports. Interestingly, the complete market models generate volatilities of net exports
in line with the data, while in the model with financial autarky volatility of net exports
is too low compared to the data.
Second, and quiet interestingly, the cross-country correlation of consumption under finan-
cial autarky is equal to the correlation of GDP. This means the model can to some extend
address the so called “quantity anomaly”, that is, the fact that in the standard business
cycle model consumption correlations are more positive than GDP correlations while in
the data the opposite is true. One reason for this finding is the measurement issue for
GDP. Recall that GDP is value added minus investment in technology capital. We will
see below that when countries are relatively closed, measured GDP over-estimates the
cross-country correlation of aggregate activity. This means that cross-country correlation
of actual output is lower. In addition, when countries are relatively closed to FDI, cross-
country correlations of consumption is closer to actual value added. The other reason
is the presence of multinational-specific shocks that are uncorrelated across countries.
Absent other international assets than FDI, households cannot insure this risk and con-
sumption correlations are lower than without these shocks. I conjecture that for the same
reasons the financial autarky model implies a cross-country correlation of employment in
line with the data.
Third, the introduction of multinational-specific shocks leaves the business cycle mo-
ments mostly unaffected while it helps to match the volatility of measured returns. This
confirms to some extent the validity of my calibration strategy where the volatility of
the multinational-specific shocks was chosen in order to match the standard deviation of
measured returns on FDI.
To summarize, the results in this section show that introducing technology capital and
multinational-specific shocks into a standard international business cycle model generates
plausible business cycle statistics, and helps to explain some features of the data the
standard model has difficulties with.
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Figure 2.3: FDI openness and investment synchronization
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2.4.2 FDI integration and business cycle synchronization
This sections connects the quantitative results of the model with the empirical results in
the first part of the paper. I start by varying the FDI openness parameter τ and discuss
how FDI openness affects co-movement of investment and GDP, respectively. Second,
using artificial data generated by the model, I run the same regressions as in the data
and compare the obtained regression coefficients. This is a simple test whether the causal
relation in the model is consistent with the data. In addition, the model allows me to
distinguish between measured GDP as reported in national accounts and actual value
added and I will show how their co-movement patterns differ.
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FDI openness and investment synchronization
For each model version as described above (complete markets with productivity shocks
only, complete markets with both shocks, and financial autarky with both shocks), I
vary the degree of FDI openness from very low integration (τ = 0.05) to complete FDI
openness (τ = 1).35 For each value of the financial integration parameter I report the
average synchronization of investment as defined in equation (2.3). Figure 2.3 shows the
results of this exercise. In all model versions, the slope of the line is always positive; a
higher degree of FDI openness leads to more correlated investment cycles. This result is
consistent with my regression estimates in table 2.2.
There are three main conclusions from the comparison of the three model versions. First,
there is a clear ranking in terms of the slope of the increase in investment synchronization:
the smallest in the model with complete markets and productivity shocks only (panel a))
and the strongest in complete markets and both productivity and technology capital
shocks (panel b)). This suggest that both technology capital and multinational-specific
shocks are quantitatively important for understanding investment co-movement.
Second, the slope of the increase in investment synchronization under financial autarky
(panel c)) lies in between the two models with complete markets.36 When households
cannot trade any financial assets (recall that FDI is assumed to be the only asset and is
undertaken by firms) and both shocks are active, there are two counter-acting forces: on
the one hand, in response to country-specific productivity shocks, investment tends to
flow to the more productive country and this weakens investment co-movement; on the
other hand, when openness increases, firm-specific shocks to the efficiency of technology
capital become more important and returns on investment within firm become more
correlated. As described in section 2.3.5 this strengthens investment co-movement. As is
evident in panel c), the latter force is dominating for most of the range of FDI openness
τ .
Third, in all model versions, the increase in investment synchronization is fastest for
middle ranges of FDI openness τ between 0.2 and 0.8; the reason behind this is the fact
that, for these values of τ , the gains from FDI are biggest and FDI positions increase the
fastest, as shown in panel d).
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Figure 2.4: FDI openness and GDP synchronization
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FDI openness and GDP synchronization
Let us now turn to the synchronization patterns of GDP as measured in national accounts
(equation (2.21)) and actual value added (equation (2.8)). Again, for each model version
(complete markets with productivity shocks only, complete markets with both shocks,
and financial autarky with both shocks), I vary the degree of FDI openness from very
low integration (τ = 0.05) to complete FDI openness (τ = 1).37 For each value of the
financial integration parameter I report the average synchronization of GDP and value
added as defined in equation (2.2). The results are shown in figure 2.4.
35 I take a value for τ that is slightly bigger than zero for numerical reasons; a value of τ = 0.05 implies
a bilateral FDI to GDP ratio of 0.015 percent, i.e. the 2.5 percent quantile in the data.
36When considering financial autarky with productivity shocks only, investment synchronization re-
sponds slighlty negative in response to variation in τ (not shown), see appendix.
37See footnote 35.
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In all model versions, synchronization patterns of measured GDP (blue solid lines) and
value added (dashed red lines) behave quiet differently: while GDP shows a non-linear
pattern in response to variations to FDI openness τ , synchronization of value added is
constant (panel a)) or monotone increasing (panels b) and c)). This means that - due
to the mismeasurement in GDP - actual cross country co-movement is overestimated for
relatively closed country-pairs and underestimated when countries are relatively open to
FDI.
We can gain some intuition by answering the following two questions. First, under com-
plete markets with productivity shocks only (panel a)), why is GDP synchronization
falling when FDI opennes increases? When FDI openness increases, a positive productiv-
ity shock in one country benefits multinationals from both countries due to their increased
operations abroad. On impact, because expected returns increase, multinationals from
both countries increase their investment in technology capital. The more the countries
are open, the more similar in terms of size is this increase in investment in technol-
ogy capital. Domestic investment in technology capital increases by relatively less and
foreign investment in technology capital increases by relatively more when comparing a
relatively open country pair to a relatively closed country pair. Everything else equal, by
the definition of GDP (value added minus investment in technology capital), measured
GDP at home is then relatively higher and GDP abroad is relatively lower; GDP is more
negatively correlated.
Second, when looking at panels b) and c), why is GDP synchronization first increasing
(for values of τ below 0.6) and then falling again (for values of τ above 0.6)? Consider
first the complete market case as shown in panel b). In this model version, both country-
specific and multinational-specific shocks are active. In the range of τ between 0.2 and
0.6 the returns of increasing FDI is biggest as discussed above and also shown in panel
d). Therefore in this range, the country-specific and multinational-specific shock work in
the same way and measured GDP resembles the synchronization pattern of value added
(while the correlation of investment in technology capital is also increasing, see figure
2.1). Recall that following a positive shock to the domestic multinational, value added
of both countries increases because the multinational invests in both countries more. At
τ equal to approximately 0.6, however, there is a dipping point. Multinational-specific
shocks dominate and investments in technology capital become negatively correlated, even
exceeding the increase in correlation of value added. By the definition of GDP (value
added minus investment in technology capital), GDP correlation therefore decreases.
Finally, under financial autarky, the pattern of GDP and value added synchronization
resembles the pattern under complete markets. However, the lines in panel c are flatter
than the ones in panel b). Incomplete markets dampen the amplitude of the synchroniza-
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Table 2.7: Bilateral FDI linkages and synchronization: data vs. model
Data
(G7)
Model
Complete
Markets
Complete
markets,
both
shocks
Financial
autarky,
both
shocks
Coefficient on investment synchronization 1.716 0.308 1.312 0.503
(2.78)
Coefficient on GDP synchronization 0.346 -0.136 0.253 0.081
(1.41)
Coefficient on synchron. of value added n.a. 0.006 0.395 0.122
n.a.
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients in the three model versions. For convenience, column one reports
the estimated coefficients obtained from the data, taken from column (3) in tables 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. For the
empirical estimates, t-values are reported in parenthesis below. The last three columns report the estimated coefficient of
the three model versions. In the first row, the dependent variable is investment synchronization, in the second row GDP
synchronization, and in the third row it is actual value added (Y ). The right hand side variable in all regressions is log of
the sum of bilateral FDI positions divided by the sum of the countries’ GDP.
tion of GDP and value added by the same amount. This is because under this secenario,
the comparative static exercise is not really ‘ceteris paribus’. Besides the effects of tech-
nology flows associated with more FDI as described under complete markets, varying the
parameter τ picks up another force: the possibility of countries to shift resources across
country borders, hence completing the markets in terms of risk sharing. In this sense for
each value of τ the agents face a different international market structure and the effect
of FDI on investment and output co-movement is downward biased.
Regression coefficients in the model and data
In this section, I run similar regressions on model data to the ones in the empirical part
of the paper. In particular, I simulate the model for ten country pairs, varying the FDI
openness parameter (τ) smoothly from zero to one. For each country pair I simulate
the model for 48 quarters (12 years as in the data) and construct the same measure of
Investment and GDP synchronization and for bilateral FDI linkages as used in the data
analysis. I then convert the quarterly data to the yearly frequency by averaging across
quarters. Finally, I regress the obtained synchronization measures on the log of bilateral
FDI linkages. Table 2.7 reports the results for the three model versions considered.
Note that, in the last row of the table, I report the synchronization measure for actual
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value added; in the model value added differs from measured GDP because investment
in technology capital is expensed in national accounts. In the data, I do not have an
equivalent measure available, for this reason I put “n.a.” in the respective column. For
comparison in table 2.7 I also report the coefficients on the same regression using actual
data, repeating the estimates in column (3) in tables 2.2 and 2.3, respectively.
Three results emerge. First, I find that overall a higher degree of FDI integration leads
to higher level of investment synchronization, as reflected in an integration coefficient
between 0.186 and 0.831. Therefore the model explains up to 20 percent of the estimated
coefficient in the data (4.106).
Second, the the sign of relation between FDI integration and GDP synchronization is
ambiguous; the estimated coefficients in the model range from -0.092 to 0.159 where the
latter value is very close to the coefficient obtained from actual data (0.129). This suggests
that the relation between financial integration and output co-movement implied by our
model is statistically close to the one we estimate in the data. In terms of magnitude,
the estimated coefficients for GDP synchronization are significantly smaller than the
coefficients obtained for investment synchronization, as observed in the data.
Third, as reported in the last row of table 2.7, actual co-movement of aggregate activ-
ity is larger than suggested by the estimates for GDP synchronization: the regression
coefficients on actual value added range from -0.001 to 0.261, always lying above the
estimates for GDP synchronization. This means that focussing on measured GDP as an
indicator for co-movement underestimates the actual business cycle co-movement. To get
a sense for the magnitudes, consider the estimated coefficients for the model version with
complete markets and both shocks, reported in column two. The coefficient for GDP syn-
chronization is 0.159 while the one for actual value added is 0.261. Hence, when focussing
on GDP, a doubling of FDI linkages would lead to an increase in GDP synchronization
of 0.159 percentage points. In contrast, for value added a doubling of FDI linkages leads
to an increase in synchronization of 0.261 percentage points, a value that is 65 percent
higher than the one for GDP synchronization. Therefore the model gives a theoretical
rationale for a substantial bias due to measurement error that emerges because national
accounts do not include intangible capital.
2.5 Model implications for risk sharing and the ‘quan-
tity puzzle’.
In this section I discuss the model implications for two important issues in international
macroeconomics. First, how does financial integration affect consumption risk sharing
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Figure 2.5: Consumption risk premium as function of FDI linkages
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possibilities of countries? It is possible to say something about the risk sharing implica-
tions of multinational production by looking at the ex-ante certainty equivalent of risky
returns.38 Second, in the financial autarky version of the model, we can revisit the so
called quantity puzzle, that is, the fact that in standard international macromodels, con-
sumption correlation generically exceeds output correlations, however in the data the
opposite is the case. For that purpose I compare the cross-country correlation of con-
sumption with the cross-country correlation of GDP in the financial autarky model when
increasing FDI openness τ .
2.5.1 Risk sharing implications
In order to asses how FDI openness affects the riskiness of consumption and therefore
welfare, I compute the certainty equivalent (in terms of consumption) that makes the
households indifferent between the expected discounted value of consuming forever the
expected value of consumption (and working forever one-third of the time) and the ex-
pected present value of the risky consumption and leisure stream at period 0. Formally,
for all model versions, I compute λ that solves:
1
1− βU(E(C), E(L)) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct(1 + λ), Lt)
]
I will also refer to λ as the risk premium. Figure 2.5 shows the risk premium as defined
above for the three model versions; the blue line refers to the complete market model with
38See Ramondo and Rappoport (2010) for theoretical results within a similar model with two periods.
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only country-specific shocks, the red-line refers to the complete market case with both
country-specific and multinational-specific shocks, and the green short dashed line refers
to the financial autarky model with both shocks. In all specifications the risk premium
decreases with increasing FDI openness. For the complete markets model versions this
means that more FDI linkages leads to a decrease in aggregate consumption risk. The
first important thing to take away here is that the presence of technology capital has a
decreasing effect on risk premia. Second, quantitatively, the model with just country-
specific shocks (blue line) implies decrease of the conumption risk premium by 11 percent
when comparing complete FDI openness (τ = 1) to very low FDI openness (τ → 0).39 In
contrast, the complete market model with both shocks implies a decrease of 6 percent,
a bit less than half of the effect without multinational-specific shocks. This means that
multinational-specific shocks actually increase global risk and therefore mitigate the po-
tential gains of multinational production in terms of aggregate consumption risk. This
result goes into the same direaction as Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Perri (2013)
who find that shocks to banking activity increase international co-movement.40
For completeness, in the financial autarky case, consumption risk premia fall by 15 per-
cent. Note however, that this does not imply that aggregate risk goes up or down because
FDI also increases cross-country risk sharing and here here only the net effect is plotted.
2.5.2 The puantity puzzle and international correlations
The standard one-good two-country international macro model with complete or incom-
plete markets predicts consumption correlation to be higher than GDP correlation. The
fact that in the data for developed countries the opposite is true is known as the so called
quantity puzzle. In this section I want to assess the impact of FDI openness on the
relation between consumption correlation and GDP correlation. There have been various
attempts to explain the quantity puzzle, for example shocks to household tastes (Stock-
man and Tesar, 1995) or incompleteness of international financial markets (Kehoe and
Perri, 2002), but to the best of my knowledge these approaches do resolve the issue only
partially. In addition, because of the special setup considered here, I can provide com-
parative static results with respect to FDI openness parameter τ . Of course, this exercise
makes only sense in the financial autarky model (otherwise consumption correlation is
always equal to one).
39Please note that here I am referring to relative changes of the risk premium not to changes in
percentage points.
40Banks in their setup are the only firms who can invest abroad by giving loans to foreigners who do
not have access to international financial markets
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Figure 2.6: FDI openness and real synchronization, financial autarky with both shocks
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80
Sy
nc
hr
on
iza
tio
n 
(pe
rce
nt)
FDI position (percent of GDP)
a) GDP, TFP and Consumption
GDP
TFP
Consumption
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80
Sy
nc
hr
on
iza
tio
n 
(pe
rce
nt)
FDI position (percent of GDP)
b) Investments and labor
Inv. phys. capital
Inv. techn. capital
Labor (hours)
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80
Sy
nc
hr
on
iza
tio
n 
(pe
rce
nt)
FDI position (percent of GDP)
c) Dividends
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
FD
I l
in
ka
ge
s 
(pe
rce
nt 
of 
GD
P)
FDI openness τ
d) FDI linkages
Figure 2.6 plots cross-country correlations of hp-filtered simulated quarterly data (using
an HP parameter equal to 1600) for important real variables as a function of FDI inte-
gration (FDI/GDP) when varying τ smoothly from zero to one. Panel a) confronts the
cross-country correlation of consumption (long dashed red line) with that of GDP (blue
solid line) and TFP (short dashed green line). There are three noteworthy features here.
First, for FDI integration below 25 percent, consumption correlation lies slightly below
GDP correlation. Afterwards GDP correlation shows its hump-shaped pattern as already
discussed above while consumption correlation continues to increase. Interestingly it does
so very slowly and even when τ is equal to one (implying an FDI position relative to GDP
of 85 percent) it is 0.6, way below perfect risk sharing. This is due to the presence of
shocks to multinational-activity. Multinationals are able to hedge country-specific risks
by efficiently allocating there resources across country borders; however they are still
affected by multinational-specific shocks. Under the assumption that households cannot
internationally trade any financial assets, they are not able to hedge away these risks.
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Therefore, one valid possibility to identify shocks to multinationals in this model, would
be to match the relation between consumption correlation and GDP correlation. This is
an interesting future research avenue.
The second interesting finding is evident from panel b) in figure 2.6. The cross-country
correlation of investment to technology capital decreases and eventually becomes negative
while investment in physical capital increases as FDI openness increases. In a sense,
technology capital plays the role of capital in a standard business cycle model: The
firms that are more efficient (high realisation of multinational-specific shock) increases
its investment in technology capital while less productive firms find it too expensive to
do so and therefore decrease their investment in technology capital.
Third, cross-country correlation of hours worked decreases when FDI openness increases
in the financial autarky case considered here. There are two forces at work. On the
one hand, labor correlation increases because of more FDI. The reason is the same as for
investment in physical capital: foreign multinationals demand more labor when they have
relatively high productivity; when countries are more open to FDI this affects more and
more both countries and this potentially pushes up labor co-movement.41 On the other
hand, because of increasing risk sharing due to the presence of multinationals (they hedge
country-specific shocks), households from countries with more efficient multinationals
have a higher marginal utility of leisure and therefore work more. This pushes the cross-
country correlation of hours
Table 2.8 summarizes the findings above but in a different way. It shows the same
regressions as described in section 2.2 for investment and GDP also for consumption,
labor, and TFP. In the column denoted by ’data (G7)’ I report the empirical estimates
using the empricial specification in (2.1) for the analogous synchronization measures for
consumption, labor and TFP for the G7 countries. The remaining columns report the
results of the same regressions for the three model versions. From the point estimates
in the data column, the ranking of relation between FDI opennes and the respective
variables should be the following way: Labor (hours), GDP, consumption, TFP. The
complete market case with both shocks predicts the following ranking: Labor (hours),
GDP, consumption, TFP (the consumption correlation is trivial as it always remains
equal to one, of course). The interesting thing here is that it gets the ranking between
Labor and GDP right. as indicated above, the financial autarky model predicts a point
estimate for consumption that exceeds the estimate on consumption. Note however, if
one increases the volatility of multinational-specific shocks, one could match the ranking
41In fact, under complete markets cross-country labor correlation unambigously increases as shown
below in table 2.8. See discussion below.
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Table 2.8: Bilateral FDI linkages and synchronization: data vs. model., other real vari-
ables
Data
(G7)
Model
Complete
Markets
Complete
markets,
both
shocks
Financial
autarky,
both
shocks
Coefficient on GDP synchronization 0.346 -0.136 0.253 0.081
(1.41)
Coefficient on consumption synchronization 0.196 0.000 0.000 0.140
(0.98)
Coefficient on labor synchronization 0.389 0.004 0.263 -0.019
(1.75)
Coefficient on tfp synchronization 0.13 -0.153 -0.007 0.060
(1.65)
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients in the three model versions. For convenience, column one reports
the estimated coefficients obtained from the data, taken from column (3) in tables 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. For the
empirical estimates, t-values are reported in parenthesis below. The last three columns report the estimated coefficient of
the three model versions. In the first row, the dependent variable is investment synchronization, in the second row GDP
synchronization, and in the third row it is actual value added (Y ). The right hand side variable in all regressions is log of
the sum of bilateral FDI positions divided by the sum of the countries’ GDP.
of the estimates.42
2.6 Summary
In this paper, I document that FDI integration and investment synchronization are posi-
tively correlated. This is an important finding because the standard international business
cycle model predicts the opposite. I then propose a tractable international business cy-
cle model where multinational firms engage in FDI and multinational activity is subject
to shocks. I show that the positive association between FDI openness and investment
synchronization is consistent with the hypothesis that multinationals play an important
role for the international transmission of shocks. The model also gives a rationale for the
weak link between financial integration on GDP co-movement. Due to mismeasurement
of GDP reported in national accounts, actual output co-movement is overestimated when
42In a model version with only multinational-specific shocks, GDP correlation generically exceeds
consumption correlation. Only for values of τ very close to one the ranking changes. These are not
shown but available upon request.
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countries are relatively closed and underestimated when countries are relatively open to
FDI.
There are three main lessons from the theory. First, more FDI openness leads unambigu-
ously to higher investment synchronization across country borders. This result holds in
model specifications with complete and financial autarky, respectively.
Second, shocks to multinational activity are important to quantitatively account for the
estimated link between FDI integration and investment synchronization. The regression
coefficients estimated on artificial data from the model with multinational-specific shocks
quantitatively explain 20 percent of the empirical regression coefficients, compared to 6
percent in the model version without multinational-specific shocks.
Third, because measured GDP is distorted, the regression coefficients on actual output
synchronization are 0.04 to 0.1 percentage points higher than the coefficients for GDP
synchronization. This are significant numbers amounting to 30 to 75 percent of the
empirical point estimate. As I abstract from many other forms of intangible capital
(potentially worsen the measurement issue) it is not clear whether these estimates are
upper or lower bounds. I leave this for future research.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Data
The following series used in Figure 1 and Figure 2 are from Federal Reserve Economic
Data: the federal funds rate, the one year mortgage interest rate (released by the Primary
Mortgage Market Survey by Freddie Mac), the mortgage (defined as home mortgages from
the balance sheet of U.S. households and nonprofit organizations) and real estate (defined
as the market value of real estate from the balance sheet of U.S. households and nonprofit
organizations). All series are at quarterly frequency. The series for house prices is the
National Composite Home Price Index for the United States (the release is by S&P/Case-
Shiller Home Price Indices). The spread has been calculated as the difference between
the one year mortgage interest rate and the federal funds rate each quarter.
In the calibration section, we calculate housing wealth as percentage of US nominal GDP
(yearly) by using historical data of the flows of funds tables from the Board of Governors.
US nominal GDP is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Our definition of housing
wealth includes the market value of real estate belonging to households, non-profit and
non-financial non-corporate business.
The micro-data used for the calibration of the relative wealth distribution of borrowers
and the leverage ratio are provided by the 1998 to 2009 waves of Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF). Unfortunately, the SCF does not provide information on the precise
date at which households were interviewed. Consequently, we assume that the observed
portfolios in 2009 reflect the distribution of household net worth at the end of 2007.
Averaging for all the waves between 1998 and 2009 helps in targeting data moments
that are not strongly influenced by the years preceding the Great Recession. Surveyed
households have been partitioned into borrowers and savers depending on their net asset
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position. The net asset position is defined as the sum of savings bonds, directly held
bonds, the cash value of life insurance, certificates of deposits, quasi-liquid retirement
accounts and all other types of transaction accounts (we consider these aggregated values
to be deposits in the model) minus the debt secured by primary residence (mortgages,
home equity loans, etc.) and the debt secured by other residential property, credit card
debt and other forms of debt (we refer to these aggregated values as debt in the model).
If the net asset position is positive, we consider the household to be a saver in our
model economy, otherwise we consider her to be a borrower. The reason to use a broad
definition of aggregate deposits and debt in the data counterpart is that it is difficult
to target borrowers and savers by strictly restricting attention to particular classes of
debt. We moreover define net wealth per capita as the sum of the net asset position and
the value of the primary residence and other residential properties, for both leveraged
and net savers. Finally, we aggregate the net wealth of both groups (borrowers and
savers) and we calculate the relative net wealth of borrowers as the ratio between their
net wealth over the total net wealth in the economy. The leverage ratio of the borrowers
is instead obtained as the weighted average mean (using SCF sample weights) of the net
asset position over the value of primary and secondary residences. The reference values
that are matched by the model are obtained by cutting the 5% tails of the distribution of
net worth in each wave of the SCF This is done to cut the extreme observations that may
bias the average values of net worth in the US economy. We want, in fact, to avoid the
possibility of including in the range of borrower households that maintain large positions
in the stock or housing markets and hold little savings.
A.2 Numerical Details
The algorithm employed is an adoption of the time-iteration procedure with linear inter-
polation used in Grill and Brumm (2010). As we have only two agents, a fine grid for
wealth is enough to deliver satisfactorily small Euler errors. For this reason, we do not
adapt the grid around the points where the collateral constraint is binding, as proposed
by Grill and Brumm (2010).
A.2.1 Equilibrium conditions
We want to describe the equilibrium in our economy in terms of policy functions that
map the current state into current policies. Furthermore, we want to focus on recursive
mappings - that is, time-invariant functions that satisfy the period-by-period first-order
equilibrium conditions. In what follows, we characterize these equilibrium conditions in
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every detail. For each agent i = b, s, denote by νi(w, z) the Lagrange multiplier with
respect to her budget constraint and by φi(w, z) the Kuhn- Tucker multiplier attached
to her collateral constraint. In addition, we treat saving and debt as two separate assets:
saving is an asset in which the agent can only take long positions, si ≥ 0; debt is an
asset with return RD in which agents can only take short positions, di ≤ 0. Denote the
Kuhn-Tucker multipliers attached to these inequalities as χi and µi, respectively. Then,
for each tuple consisting of wealth and exogenous state today σ = (w, z), the (time-
invariant) policy and pricing functions have to satisfy the following system of equations
(we will show below how to solve for these time-invariant functions):
• Agent’s first order conditions
u1(ci(σ), hi(σ))− νi(σ) = 0
u2(ci(σ), hi(σ))− q(σ)νi(σ) = 0
−νi(σ) + βiE[νi(σ+)|σ]R(σ) + χi(σ) = 0, i = s, b
−νi(σ) + βiE[νi(σ+)|σ]RD + φi(σ)RD(w, z)− µi(σ) = 0
−νi(σ)q(σ) + u2(ci(σ), hi(σ))+
+βiE[νi(σ+)q(σ+)]|σ] + φi(σ)mE[q(σ+)|σ] = 0
• Agent’s budget constraints
nby(s) + nbΥ(σ) + w · q(σ)− db(σ)− sb(σ)− q(σ)hb(σ)− cb(σ) = 0
nsy(s) + nsΥ(σ) + (1− w) · q(σ)− ds(σ)− ss(σ)− q(σ)hs(σ)− cs(σ) = 0
NB: Here we have already used the definition for the borrower’s wealth share and
rewritten the budget constraints in these terms (see the law of motion for wealth
below as a reminder of how we defined the wealth share).
• Zero profits in the financial sector
θ(s) ·RD(σ)−R(σ) = 0
• Market clearing in housing and financial sector
hs(σ) + hb(σ)− 1 = 0
db(σ) + ds(σ) + θ(s) · (sb(σ) + ss(σ)) = 0
• Transfers
Υ(σ)− (1− θ(s))(sb(σ) + ss(σ)) = 0
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• Complementary slackness conditions
µi(σ) ≥ 0, di(σ) ≥ 0, µi(σ)⊥di(σ)
χi(σ) ≥ 0, si(σ) ≥ 0, χ(σ)⊥si(σ), i = s, b
φi(σ) ≥ 0, CCi(σ) ≥ 0, φi(σ)⊥CCi(σ)
where CCi(·) is the collateral constraint of agent i, that is,
CCi(σ) ≡ RD(σ)di(σ) +mE[q(σ+)|σ]hi(σ) ≥ 0
• Implicit “Law of motion” for borrower’s wealth share
w+(σ, z+) ≡ RD(σ)db(σ) +R(σ)sb(σ) + q(w
+(σ, z+), z+)hb(σ)
q(w+(σ, z+), z+) .
A.2.2 Algorithm
The structure of the above period-by-period equilibrium conditions can be summarized
as follows: Given a guess for the policy and pricing functions in the next period - denoted
by fprime - we can compute the expectations in the agents’ first order conditions. The
functions that map current states to current policies - denoted by f - are then obtained
by solving the static system of non-linear given in the previous subsection. More formally,
the structure of the problem can be summarized as follows. For all tuples σ = (w, z), we
have
ψ(fprime)(σ, f(σ), µ(σ)) = 0, ζ(σ, f(σ)) ≥ 0⊥ µ(σ) ≥ 0.
The system of equations ψ[fprime](·) contains first order conditions of agents and the
financial sector and market clearing conditions. The function ζ(·) contains the sign re-
strictions and collateral constraints. µ(·) denotes the respective Kuhn-Tucker multipliers.
A recursive policy function f then solves ψ[f ](σ, f(σ)µ(σ)) = 0 such that the comple-
mentary slackness conditions are satisfied. The time iteration algorithm defined below
finds the approximate recursive policy function iteratively.
In each iteration, taking as given a guess for fprime, we obtain f by solving the above
system of equations and then updating our guess by interpolating the obtained policy
function on the implicitly defined next period wealth. The following box summarizes our
algorithm in a form of Pseudo-code:
1. Select a grid W , an initial guess f init and an error tolerance . Set fprime = f init.
2. Make one time-iteration step:
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(a) For all σ = (w, z), where w ∈ W , find the function f(σ) that solves
ψ(fprime)(σ, f(σ), µ(σ)) = 0, ζ(σ, f(σ)) ≥ 0⊥ µ(σ) ≥ 0.
(b) Use the solution f and the guess fprime to update wealth tomorrow and inter-
polate f on the obtained values for wealth tomorrow.
3. If ||f − fprime|| < , go to step 4. Else set fprime = f and repeat step 2.
4. Set numerical solution f˜ equal to the solution of the infinite horizon problem, f˜ = f .
A.2.3 Kuhn-Tucker equations (Garcia-Zangwill trick)
At each grid point - given the guesses of the policy functions for the next period - we
have to solve a system of nonlinear equations, containing both inequalities and equalities.
The period-by-period equilibrium conditions are basically standard Kuhn-Tucker (K-T)
conditions. In order to employ standard non-linear equation solvers like fsolve in Matlab
or Ziena’s Knitro, it is computationally more stable to eliminate the inequalities and
recast the problem as a system consisting of equations only. In this section we describe
how to do this. In general, we can write the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of any convex NLP
problem as:
∆f(x)′ +
r∑
j=1
λj∆gj(x)′ +
s∑
j=1
µj∆hj(x)′ = 0 (A.1)
λj ≥ 0, gj(x) ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , r
λjgj(x) = 0, j = 1, . . . , r
hj(x) = 0, j = 1, . . . , s
plus a constraint qualification restriction (CQ). The system in (A.1) are mixtures of
equalities and inequalities. Since inequalities tend to be cumbersome and can potentially
prevent numerical software from solving the NLP via path-following, we will rewrite the
K-T conditions so that they are a system consisting solely of equations (Zangwill and
Garcia, 1981). The reformulation is as follows. Let k be a positive integer, and given
α ∈ R1, define:
α+ = [max{0, α}]k
α− = [max{0,−α}]k.
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Hence, we always have α+ ≥ 0, α− ≥ 0, and α+α− = 0. Note also that both variables,
α+and α−, are (k − 1)-continuously differentiable. Using this transformation, we can
recast the K-T conditions and create the Kuhn-Tucker equations (Zangwill and Garcia,
1981):
∆f(x)′ +
r∑
j=1
α+j ∆gj(x)′ +
s∑
j=1
µj∆hj(x)′ = 0 (A.2)
α−j − gj(x) = 0, j = 1, . . . , r
hj(x) = 0, j = 1, . . . , s
where α = (α1, . . . , αr) ∈ Rr and (α+, α−) are defined as above. Note that the (K-
T) equations defined here are precisely equivalent to the K-T conditions in (A.1). In
particular, if (x∗, α∗, µ∗) satisfies the K-T equations, then (x∗, λ∗, µ∗) satisfies the the
K-T conditions with λ∗j ≡ (α∗j )+, j = 1, . . . , r. Conversely, if (x∗, λ∗, µ∗) satisfies the K-T
conditions in (A.1), then (x∗, α∗, µ∗) satisfies the K-T equations in (A.2) with
α∗j ≡
(λ
∗
j)1/k if gj(x∗) = 0
−(g(x∗)j)1/k if gj(x∗) > 0
j = 1, . . . , r.
A.2.4 Numerical Accuracy
In order to measure the accuracy of our approximation procedure, we calculate two
statistics: first, we compute the relative Euler errors along the equilibrium path for very
long time series. Second, for each exogenous shock, we randomly draw 3000 points from
the wealth grid and compute the relative Euler Errors. To summarize the findings: for
all simulated models, the maximum relative Euler Error is 3e-5 (or -4.5 in log(10)-scale).
This implies that an agent, using our approximation of the equilibrium policy functions,
would lose 30 Dollars for each million spent. It is important to compare this number to the
welfare gains we obtain in the benchmark model. The borrowers’ welfare loss on impact
of an financial intermediation shock is 0.07 percentage points, that is, in log(10) scale,
equal to -3.15. This number is one order of magnitude bigger, so even when netting these
numbers by the mistakes that agents make, we conclude that our quantitative findings
are still valid.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Data
Quarterly output and investment data are from OECD Quarterly National Accounts.
The real series are annualized in constant US Dollars (OECD reference year), converted
at fixed PPP exchange rates and seasonally adjusted (series VPVOBARSA). Correla-
tions are the yearly average of 20 quarter rolling window estimates after HP-filtering
data. The synchronization measures are calculated as explained in the main text. Yearly
nominal GDP is from OECD National Accounts, annualized values in current US Dollars,
converted at current PPP exchange rates, and seasonally adjusted (series CPCARSA).
Bilateral outward and inward foreign direct investment data are from the OECD Foreign
Direct Investment Database at a yearly frequency. Note that a general caveat of FDI
data is that it is usually recorded at historical cost, so the FDI positions do not nec-
essarily reflect actual market values. Total foreign direct investment data are from the
OECD foreign direct investment data and from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Bilateral
exports and imports are from the OECD monthly trade statistics. Population data are
from OECD labor market statistics. Industrial specialization in year t is calculated as
in Imbs (2006); it is the absolute distance of the shares in value added of each sector in
countries i and j, summing over all sectors. The data are from the OECD Statistics on
Measuring Globalisation.
Table B.1 summarizes the country pairs with all FDI data are available throughout the
whole sample from 1990 to 2006 and 1995 to 2006, respectively. An exception is Japan,
bilateral FDI data are available from 1985 to 1994 and 1996 to 2006 only, 1995 is not
reported in the OECD database. For not deleting a G7 member from the analysis, I used
linear interpolation to obtain the bilateral FDI positions for 1995.
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Table B.1: Country pairs used in empirical analysis
Balanced Sample, 1991 - 2006
AUT,CAN AUT,DEU AUT,FRA AUT,GBR AUT,USA CAN,DEU CAN,FRA CAN,GBR
CAN,ITA CAN,JPN CAN,NOR CAN,USA DEU,GBR DEU,ITA DEU,JPN DEU,NLD
DEU,NOR DEU,SWE DEU,USA FRA,DEU FRA,GBR FRA,ITA FRA,JPN FRA,NLD
FRA,NOR FRA,SWE FRA,USA GBR,USA ITA,GBR ITA,JPN ITA,NLD ITA,USA
JPN,GBR JPN,NLD JPN,USA NLD,GBR NLD,USA NOR,SWE NOR,USA SWE,USA
Notes: The table lists the country-pairs for which bilateral data were available in all years without gaps used in the respective samples.
Essentially, it consists of the 21 G7 country pairs plus pairs involving Austria, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Please read the note
regarding the bilateral FDI positions reported by Japan in this appendix.
B.2 Additional empirical results and robustness checks
This section presents several robustness checks for the empirical results in the main text.
First, I include in the analysis all 40 countries for which I have information between the
years 1991 to 2006. Table B.2 reports the results for investment synchronization. The
main message remains, more bilateral FDI linkages are associated with more investment
synchronization. The point estimates are of the same order of magnitude and do not dif-
fer between G7 country pairs and other country pairs (I tested this formally by including
an interaction term between a G7-pair-dummy and FDI and trade openness, respectively.
The estimate is not significant different from zero. The results are not reported here but
available upon request from the author). Note that the estimates significant different
from zero for specifications in which interaction terms between FDI openness and indus-
trial specialization and between trade openness and industrial specialization, respectively,
are included. For that purpose I define a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if spe-
cialisation is smaller or equal to the median specialization. For country-years in which
specialization exceeds the median specialization, the dummy is equal to one.
The results for GDP synchronization are as for G7 countries only. The point estimates are
positive but not statistically different from zero, even when including interaction terms
between FDI openness and specialization and trade openness and specialization.
Second, in table B.4 and B.5, I report regressions for HP-filtered data. For this purpose,
I regress the 20 quarter cross-correlation of HP-filtered data in period t on FDI and trade
openness in year t − 5, that is, the initial value of the 20-quarter window. All other
controls (log of product of GDP per capita, log of product of population, log of industrial
specialization index) are also lagged by 5 years. Note that qualitatively the results remain
the same when regressing the correlations on the 5 year averages of the time windows
(not reported, available upon request). I prefer the former specification because there
is more likelihood that exogeneity of the regressors and the residuals hold. For the HP-
filtered data, I also splitted the sample in three non-overlapping time periods, 1991- 1996,
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Table B.2: Bilateral FDI linkages and investment synchronization, all country pairs
Dependent Variable: Investment growth synchronization (annualized)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FDI/GDP 0.676 0.537 1.201† 2.044**
(0.83) (0.84) (1.58) (2.65)
FDI
GDP
×Dspec -0.978**
(-2.63)
FDI/Total FDI 0.545 0.146 0.814 1.239*
(0.69) (0.21) (1.12) (1.78)
FDI
TotalFDI
×Dspec -0.420
(-0.98)
Country-pair fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Country trends Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
R-squared (within) 0.171 0.187 0.251 0.258 0.172 0.183 0.249 0.250
Observations 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600
Notes: The table reports panel (country-pair) fixed-effect coefficients estimated over the period 1991 to 2006 of the G7 countries plus country
pairs involving Austria, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden (in total, 40 country pairs). These are all countries for which bilateral FDI positions
are available for all years. The dependent variable is minus one times the absolute value of the difference in quarterly growth rate of aggregate
investment between country i and j in year t (the yearly estimate is obtained by averaging over the respective four quarterly estimates). In
columns (1) - (4) FDI integration is measured by the log of the share of the stock of bilateral Foreign Direct Investment Assets and Liabilities
between countries i and j in the previous year relative to the sum of the two countries’ GDP in the previous year (denoted FDI/GDP). In
columns (5) - (8) FDI integration is measured by the log of the share of the stock of bilateral Foreign Direct Investment Assets and Liabilities
between countries i and j in the previous year relative to the sum of the two countries’ total FDI Assets and FDI Liabilities in the entire
world in the previous year (denoted FDI/Total FDI). All specifications also include the log of the two countries’ GDP per capita, the log of
the product of both countries’ populations in the previous year, trade openness measured by Trade/GDP (in spec. (1) to (4)) or Trade/Total
Trade (in spec. (5) to (8)), and the log of an index measuring industrial specialization, all lagged by one period (year). The specification in
(4) includes an interaction term between FDI/GDP and a dummy variable (Dspec) that takes on the value one if the specialization index of
a country pair is bigger than the median specialization of the sample and zero otherwise. Analogously it includes the same interaction term
for Trade/GDP (not reported). Specification (8) includes an interaction term between FDI/Total FDI and a dummy variable (Dspec) that
takes on the value one if the specialization index of a country pair is bigger than the median specialization of the sample and zero otherwise.
The specifications in columns (1) and (5) include country-specific linear time-trends. The specifications in columns (2) and (6) include time
fixed-effects. The specifications in columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) include time fixed-effects and country-specific linear time-trends. Standard
errors adjusted for panel (country-pair) specific auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity and corresponding t-statistics are reported below the
estimated coefficients. † denotes significance at the 85% confidence level, * denotes significance at the 90% confidence level, ** denotes
significance at the 95% confidence level, *** denotes significance at the 99% confidence level. For a detailed data description see appendix
B.1.
1996- 2001, and 2001 - 2006. As dependent variables I use the cross-country correlation
of hp-filtered GDP and investment, respectively, computed for the 20 quarters of each
time period. I then regress GDP and investment correlation on the log of bilateral FDI
linkages at the beginning of each time period, that is, FDI position in 1991, 1996, and
2001, respectively. For all these robustness checks, the findings are similar to the ones of
the benchmark estimates in the main text. More FDI linkages are associated with higher
investment correlations, and there is no statistical link between FDI linkages and GDP
correlations (though the point estimate is positive).
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Table B.3: Bilateral FDI linkages and GDP synchronization, all country-pairs
Dependent Variable: GDP growth synchronization (annualized)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FDI/GDP 0.393* -0.00377 0.297† 0.269
(1.88) (-0.02) (1.48) (1.21)
FDI
GDP
×Dspec 0.0298
(0.25)
FDI/Total FDI 0.333† -0.0497 0.290 0.209
(1.55) (-0.24) (1.46) (0.94)
FDI
TotalFDI
×Dspec 0.0799
(0.60)
Country-pair fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Country trends Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
R-squared (within) 0.239 0.279 0.360 0.360 0.234 0.278 0.360 0.361
Observations 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600
Notes: The table reports panel (country-pair) fixed-effect coefficients estimated over the period 1991 to 2006 of the G7 countries plus country
pairs involving Austria, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden (in total, 40 country pairs). These are all countries for which bilateral FDI positions
are available for all years. The dependent variable is minus one times the absolute value of the difference in quarterly growth rate of aggregate
investment between country i and j in year t (the yearly estimate is obtained by averaging over the respective four quarterly estimates). In
columns (1) - (4) FDI integration is measured by the log of the share of the stock of bilateral Foreign Direct Investment Assets and Liabilities
between countries i and j in the previous year relative to the sum of the two countries’ GDP in the previous year (denoted FDI/GDP). In
columns (5) - (8) FDI integration is measured by the log of the share of the stock of bilateral Foreign Direct Investment Assets and Liabilities
between countries i and j in the previous year relative to the sum of the two countries’ total FDI Assets and FDI Liabilities in the entire
world in the previous year (denoted FDI/Total FDI). All specifications also include the log of the two countries’ GDP per capita, the log of
the product of both countries’ populations in the previous year, trade openness measured by Trade/GDP (in spec. (1) to (4)) or Trade/Total
Trade (in spec. (5) to (8)), and the log of an index measuring industrial specialization, all lagged by one period (year). The specification in
(4) includes an interaction term between FDI/GDP and a dummy variable (Dspec) that takes on the value one if the specialization index of
a country pair is bigger than the median specialization of the sample and zero otherwise. Analogously it includes the same interaction term
for Trade/GDP (not reported). Specification (8) includes an interaction term between FDI/Total FDI and a dummy variable (Dspec) that
takes on the value one if the specialization index of a country pair is bigger than the median specialization of the sample and zero otherwise.
The specifications in columns (1) and (5) include country-specific linear time-trends. The specifications in columns (2) and (6) include time
fixed-effects. The specifications in columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) include time fixed-effects and country-specific linear time-trends. Standard
errors adjusted for panel (country-pair) specific auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity and corresponding t-statistics are reported below the
estimated coefficients. † denotes significance at the 85% confidence level, * denotes significance at the 90% confidence level, ** denotes
significance at the 95% confidence level, *** denotes significance at the 99% confidence level. For a detailed data description see appendix
B.1.
81
Menno, Dominik (2014), Topics in quantitative macroeconomics 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12157
Table B.4: Bilateral FDI linkages and investment correlations, hp-filtered data
Dependent Variable: cross-country correlation of hp-filtered investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FDI/GDP 0.230** 0.248*** 0.214** 0.237**
(2.38) (2.88) (2.31) (2.50)
Trade/GDP -0.594**
(-2.27)
FDI/Total FDI 0.167† 0.193** 0.188* 0.243**
(1.66) (2.09) (1.99) (2.50)
Trade/Total Trade -0.776***
(-3.77)
Country-pair fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Country trends Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
R-squared (within) 0.396 0.367 0.461 0.475 0.388 0.357 0.459 0.490
Country-pairs 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
Observations 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480
Notes: The table reports panel (country-pair) fixed-effect coefficients estimated over the period 1991 - 2006, using a balanced panel for 40
country-pairs for which bilateral FDI positions are available for all years. A list of included countries-pairs can be found in table B.1. The
dependent variable is the five-year average cross-country correlation of hp-filtered investment in country i and j averaged over the past 20
quarters. All right hand-side variables are lagged by five periods (years), that is, measured at the beginning of the rolling windo. In columns
(1) - (4) FDI integration is measured by the log of the share of the stock of bilateral Foreign Direct Investment Assets and Liabilities between
countries i and j in the initial year of the respective time period relative to the sum of the two countries’ GDP in the in the initial year
of the respective time period (denoted FDI/GDP). In columns (5) - (8) FDI integration is measured by the log of the share of the stock of
bilateral Foreign Direct Investment Assets and Liabilities between countries i and j in the initial year of the respective time period relative
to the sum of the two countries’ total FDI Assets and FDI Liabilities vis-a-vis the entire world in the initial year of the respective time
period (denoted FDI/Total FDI). All specifications also include the log of the two countries’ GDP per capita, the log of the product of the
two countries’ population in the initial year of the respective time period, and the log of industrial specialization index. Specification (4)
includes the log of the share of bilateral export and import flows between countries i and j in the initial year of the respective time period
relative to the sum of the two countries’ GDP in the initial year of the respective time period (Trade/GDP). Specification (8) includes the
log of the share of bilateral export and import flows between countries i and j in the initial year of the respective time period relative to the
sum of the two countries’ total exports and imports in the initial year of the respective time period (Trade/Total Trade). The specifications
in columns (1) and (5) include country-specific linear time-trends. The specifications in columns (2) and (6) include time fixed-effects. The
specifications in columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) include time fixed-effects and country-specific linear time-trends. Standard errors adjusted for
panel (country-pair) specific auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity and corresponding t-statistics are reported below. † denotes significance
at the 85% confidence level, * denotes significance at the 90% confidence level, ** denotes significance at the 95% confidence level, *** denotes
significance at the 99% confidence level. For a detailed data description see appendix B.1.
82
Menno, Dominik (2014), Topics in quantitative macroeconomics 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12157
Table B.5: Bilateral FDI linkages and output correlations, hp-filtered data
Dependent Variable: cross-country correlation of hp-filtered GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FDI/GDP -0.0267 0.0835 0.0299 0.0410
(-0.26) (0.85) (0.37) (0.49)
Trade/GDP -0.282
(-1.27)
FDI/Total FDI -0.0114 0.122 0.0772 0.113
(-0.11) (1.39) (0.96) (1.29)
Trade/Total Trade -0.505***
(-2.80)
Country-pair fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Country trends Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
R-squared (within) 0.297 0.399 0.515 0.518 0.297 0.402 0.517 0.530
Country-pairs 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
Observations 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480
Notes: The table reports panel (country-pair) fixed-effect coefficients estimated over the period 1991 - 2006, using a balanced panel for 40
country-pairs for which bilateral FDI positions are available for all years. A list of included countries-pairs can be found in table B.1. The
dependent variable is the five-year average cross-country correlation of hp-filtered GDP in country i and j averaged over the past 20 quarters.
All right hand-side variables are lagged by five periods (years), that is, measured at the beginning of the rolling windo. In columns (1) -
(4) FDI integration is measured by the log of the share of the stock of bilateral Foreign Direct Investment Assets and Liabilities between
countries i and j in the initial year of the respective time period relative to the sum of the two countries’ GDP in the in the initial year
of the respective time period (denoted FDI/GDP). In columns (5) - (8) FDI integration is measured by the log of the share of the stock of
bilateral Foreign Direct Investment Assets and Liabilities between countries i and j in the initial year of the respective time period relative
to the sum of the two countries’ total FDI Assets and FDI Liabilities vis-a-vis the entire world in the initial year of the respective time
period (denoted FDI/Total FDI). All specifications also include the log of the two countries’ GDP per capita, the log of the product of the
two countries’ population in the initial year of the respective time period, and the log of industrial specialization index. Specification (4)
includes the log of the share of bilateral export and import flows between countries i and j in the initial year of the respective time period
relative to the sum of the two countries’ GDP in the initial year of the respective time period (Trade/GDP). Specification (8) includes the
log of the share of bilateral export and import flows between countries i and j in the initial year of the respective time period relative to the
sum of the two countries’ total exports and imports in the initial year of the respective time period (Trade/Total Trade). The specifications
in columns (1) and (5) include country-specific linear time-trends. The specifications in columns (2) and (6) include time fixed-effects. The
specifications in columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) include time fixed-effects and country-specific linear time-trends. Standard errors adjusted for
panel (country-pair) specific auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity and corresponding t-statistics are reported below. † denotes significance
at the 85% confidence level, * denotes significance at the 90% confidence level, ** denotes significance at the 95% confidence level, *** denotes
significance at the 99% confidence level. For a detailed data description see appendix B.1.
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B.2.1 The financial autarky model with country-specific shocks
only
This appendix presents - for completeness - the results on the financial autarky model and
country-specific productivity shocks only. The purpose is to show that the main results
on investment and GDP synchronization remain unaltered, even when abstracting from
multinational-specific shocks under financial autarky. Figure B.1 shows a similar plot
with respect to investment synchronization as in the main text. In panel a), I show
the benchmark results on the complete markets model with both shocks. Panel b) is
new and shows the financial autarky model with productivity shocks only, panel c) and
d) showing investment synchronization and FDI positions as functions of FDI openness
parameter τ for the financial autarky economy with both shocks, hence repeating what
is presented in the main text. It is evident from panel b) that the presence of technology
capital only leads to the prediction of increased investment synchronization, even when
financial markets are shut down and we abstract from shocks to multinational activity.
The mechanisms behind this finding are exactly the same as outlined in the main text
for the complete financial markets economies: When countries are more open to FDI,
the returns of technology capital increase for both domestic and foreign multinationals,
hence investment in technology capital increases in both countries. Because returns on all
capital types are equalized within firms, multinationals increase investment in physical
capital both at home and abroad, leading to an increase in investment co-movement.
Regarding GDP co-movement, figure B.2 shows that the findings under financial au-
tarky with productivity shocks only are very similar to the complete market model with
productivity only.
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Figure B.1: FDI openness and Investment synchronization, details on the financial au-
tarky model
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a) Complete Markets, both shocks
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b) Incomplete Markets, country-spec. shocks only
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Figure B.2: FDI openness and GDP synchronization, details on the financial autarky
model
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B.3 Model details and additional results for the fi-
nancial autarky case
B.3.1 Model Equations
In this subsection, I list the model equations, including the first order conditions of
households and firms. Note that because the model is symmetric, the first order conditions
for foreign firms are omitted.
Output in tradable good sector in the home country and relative price of intermediate
good bundle
Yt = At(kθT tl1−θT t )νX1−ν
Pt = (1− ν) Yt
Xt
Output on intermediate good sector in the home country
YIt =
[
yηdt + (y∗ft)η
] 1
η
Optimality conditions w.r.t. labor for home firms
0 = (1− θ)νYt − wtlTt
0 = (1− θ)(1− φ)ηPtY 1−ηIt yηdt − wtldt
0 = (1− θ)(1− φ)ηP ∗t (Y ∗It)1−ηyηft − w∗tlft
Value of an additional unit of investment (i.e. Lagrange multiplier on investment accu-
mulation equation) for home firms
VTt =
χ1
(
iTt
kTt−1
)−ψ−1
Vdt =
χ1
(
idt
kdt−1
)−ψ−1
Vft =
χ1
(
ift
kft−1
)−ψ−1
VMt =
χm1
(
iMt
Mt−1
)−ψm−1
87
Menno, Dominik (2014), Topics in quantitative macroeconomics 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12157
Optimality conditions with respect to investment, home firms
VTtkTt+1 = βEt
{
λt+1
λt
(
θηYt+1 − iTt+1 + VTt+1kTt+2
)}
Vdtkdt+1 = βEt
{
λt+1
λt
(
θ(1− φ)ηPtY 1−ηIt yηdt − idt+1 + Vdt+1kdt+2
)}
Vftkft+1 = βEt
{
λt+1
λt
(
θ(1− φ)ηP ∗t (Y ∗It)1−ηyηft − ift+1 + Vft+1kft+2
)}
VMtMt+1 = βEt
{
λt+1
λt
[
φη
(
PtY
1−η
It y
η
dt + P ∗t (Y ∗It)1−ηy
η
ft
)
− iMt+1 + VMt+1Mt+2
]}
Domestic and foreign production by home owned multinationals
ydt = eztMφt
(
kθdtl
1−θ
dt
)1−φ
yft = τeztMφt
(
kθftl
1−θ
ft
)1−φ
Total dividends households in the home country receive
dt = (Yt − wtlTt − iTt) + (PtY 1−ηIt yηdt − wtldt − idt)
+ (P ∗t (Y ∗It)1−ηy
η
ft − w∗t lft − ift)− iMt
Capital accumulation
kjt+1 = (1− δ)kjt +
χ1
(
ijt
kjt
)1−ψ
1− ψ + χ2
 kjt j = T, d, f
Mt+1 = (1− δm)Mt +
χm1
(
iMt
Mt
)1−ψm
1− ψm + χ
m
2
Mt
Analoguous for foreign firms. Domestic and foreign households
λt = U1(Ct, L¯− Lt)
λ∗t = U1(C∗t , L¯− L∗t )
0 = U2(Ct, L¯− Lt) + λtwt
0 = U2(C∗t , L¯− L∗t ) + λ∗tw∗t
Labor market clearing
Lt = lTt + ldt + l∗ft
L∗t = l∗Tt + l∗dt + lft
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Goods market clearing
Yt + Y ∗t = Ct + C∗t + iTt + i∗Tt + idt + ift + i∗dt + i∗ft + iMt + i∗Mt
International financial markets:
a) Complete financial markets
λt = λ∗t
b) Financial autarky
Ct = wtLt + dTt + dMt
B.3.2 Deterministic steady state
The system of equations in the deterministic steady state for two complete open economies
τ = 1 are given by
1− β(1− δ)
νθβ
= Y
K1
1− β(1− δ)
νθβ
= Y
∗
K∗1
1− β(1− δ)
(1− φ)θηβ = PY
1−η
2
yηd
kd
1− β(1− δ)
(1− φ)θηβ = PY
1−η
2
(y∗f )η
k∗f
1− β(1− δ)
(1− φ)θηβ = P
∗(Y ∗2 )1−η
yηf
kf
1− β(1− δ)
(1− φ)θηβ = P
∗(Y ∗2 )1−η
(y∗d)η
k∗d
1− β(1− δm)
φηβ
=
PY 1−η2 y
η
d + P ∗(Y ∗2 )1−ηy
η
f
M
1− β(1− δm)
φηβ
=
P ∗(Y ∗2 )1−η(y∗d)η + PY
1−η
2 (y∗f )η
M∗
wL1 = (1− θ)νY wL∗1 = (1− θ)νY ∗
wld = (1− θ)(1− φ)ηPY 1−η2 yηd wl∗f = (1− θ)(1− φ)ηPY 1−η2 (y∗f )η
w∗l∗d = (1− θ)(1− φ)ηP ∗(Y ∗2 )1−η(y∗d)η w∗lf = (1− θ)(1− φ)ηP ∗(Y ∗2 )1−ηyηf
L = l∗f + ld + L1 L∗ = L∗1 + l∗d + lf
K = k∗f + kd +K1 K∗ = K∗1 + k∗d + kf
Y = (Kθ1L1−θ1 )νY 1−ν2 Y ∗ = ((K∗1)θ(L∗1)1−θ)ν(Y ∗2 )1−ν
P = (1− ν)Y P ∗ = (1− ν)Y ∗
c+ c∗ + δ(K +K∗) + δm(M +M∗) = Y + Y ∗
Note that when τ = 1 both countries are identical, therefore all home and foreign quan-
tities and prices are identical, so I will omit for now the asterisk. One can show that
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(kd + kf )/K1 = (ld + lf )/L1 = ξ, with ξ = (1− φ)(1− ν)η/ν. Also note that the param-
eters of the utility function are set so that L = 1 in steady state, so that we obtain the
following system of equation for technology, physical capital and aggregate output:
M = φβ(1− ν)η1− β(1− δm)Y
K = (1− φ)θβ(1− ν)η1− β(1− δ) Y
Y = 21−ν
(
1
1 + ξ
)ν (
ξ
1 + ξ
)(1−φ)(1−ν)
Kθ(ν+(1−ν)(1−φ))
We can combine these equations and obtain the steady state values for technology and
physical capital
M = ζ
θ(ν+(1−ν)(1−φ)
ζ3
1 ζ
1
ζ3
2
K = ζ1M
with
ζ1 ≡ θ(ν + (1− ν)(1− φ)η)
φ(1− ν)η
1− β(1− δm)
1− β(1− δ)
ζ2 ≡ φβ(1− ν)η1− β(1− δm)2
1−ν
(
1
1 + ξ
)ν (
ξ
1 + ξ
)(1−φ)(1−ν)
ζ3 ≡ 1− φ(1− ν)− θ(ν + (1− φ)(1− ν)).
All the other quantities follow by plugging in these values in the respective equations. Be-
cause financial market structure only in the economy with uncertainty, the deterministic
steady state is the same whether or not financial markets are complete.
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